



HANDBOOK

NO. 17-01



DEC 16


Scouts in Contact

Tactical Vignettes for Cavalry Leaders



**Cobra Team
Operations Group
National Training Center**

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED



**Scouts in Contact
Tactical Vignettes
for Cavalry Leaders**

DIGITAL VERSION AVAILABLE

A digital version of this CALL publication is available to view or download from the CALL website:

<http://call.army.mil>


Reproduction of this publication is welcomed and highly encouraged.

FOLLOW CALL ON SOCIAL MEDIA



https://twitter.com/USArmy_CALL

<https://www.facebook.com/CenterforArmyLessonsLearned>



Foreword

The scout's purpose will not be fulfilled without making contact with the enemy. In most cases, the scout will do so with little to no notice, under the cover of darkness, over difficult terrain, all in the name of setting conditions for the success of the formation as a whole.

Cobra Team has developed this handbook to provide commanders a tool to train young scouts to think through complex tactical problems and communicate clear, concise, and executable orders. This is not a guide on what to think, but a series of exercises to train the U.S. Army's doctrinal fundamentals in ambiguous, rapidly changing tactical situations. In the end, this handbook will increase junior leaders' ability how to think, while building their experience in a low, overhead training environment.

The vignettes featured in this handbook are real and diverse. They will challenge commanders at every level and enable meaningful learning as the scouts undertake a planning effort to deconstruct the problem set. Furthermore, they provide the opportunity to shape and improve understanding of reconnaissance and security fundamentals.

I suggest that commanders incorporate information from this handbook into their overall training methodology in the crawl phase to ensure cavalry leaders understand the fundamentals of reconnaissance and security. Repetitions and sets today will improve subsequent live performance and, more importantly, potentially save lives on the battlefield.

TRAIN THE FORCE!

A stylized, handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "JM".

Joseph M. Martin
Major General, US Army
Commanding General
The National Training Center and Fort Irwin

Scouts in Contact

Tactical Vignettes for Cavalry Leaders

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Chapter 1. Fundamentals of Reconnaissance and Security	3
Chapter 2. How Cavalrymen Decide	9
Chapter 3. How Squadron Commanders Certify Platoon Leaders With Tactical Decision Exercises	11
Chapter 4. How to Facilitate Tactical Decision Exercises	13
Chapter 5. How to Conduct After Action Reviews	15
Appendix A. Reconnaissance and Security Vignettes	17
Vignette 1. Ensure Continuous Reconnaissance	17
Vignette 2. Do Not Keep Reconnaissance Assets in Reserve	21
Vignette 3. Orient on the Reconnaissance Objective	25
Vignette 4. Report All Information Rapidly and Accurately	29
Vignette 5. Retain Freedom of Maneuver	33
Vignette 6. Gain and Maintain Enemy Contact	37
Vignette 7. Develop the Situation Rapidly	42
Vignette 8. Provide Early and Accurate Warning	46
Vignette 9. Provide Reaction Time and Maneuver Space	50
Vignette 10. Orient on the Protected Force, Area, or Facility	54
Vignette 11. Perform Continuous Reconnaissance	58
Vignette 12. Maintain Enemy Contact	62
Appendix B. Vignette Exercise Materials	67
Exercise Controller Instructions	67
Vignette 1. Ensure Continuous Reconnaissance	67
Vignette 2. Do Not Keep Reconnaissance Assets in Reserve	72

Vignette 3. Orient on the Reconnaissance Objective	75
Vignette 4. Report All Information Rapidly and Accurately	78
Vignette 5. Retain Freedom of Maneuver	83
Vignette 6. Gain and Maintain Enemy Contact	89
Vignette 7. Develop the Situation Rapidly	95
Vignette 8. Provide Early and Accurate Warning	99
Vignette 9. Provide Reaction Time and Maneuver Space	102
Vignette 10. Orient on the Protected Force, Area, or Facility	106
Vignette 11. Perform Continuous Reconnaissance	109
Vignette 12. Maintain Enemy Contact	112
Scout Platoon Formations	115
Placards	118
Appendix C. References	123

Center For Army Lessons Learned

CALL Director **COL Michael F. Pappal**

CALL Analysts **Kevin M. Kreie**

Douglas E. Willis

Contributing Authors **LTC J. Frederick Dente**

LTC Bradley S. Nelson

The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

Note: Any publications (other than CALL publications) referenced in this product, such as ARs, ADPs, ADRPs, ATPs, FMs, and TMs, must be obtained through your pinpoint distribution system.

Introduction

Someone must go forward and make contact with the enemy. This complex task falls to the cavalry squadrons of the brigade combat team. They will do this task when enablers are not in position to support. They will do it on short notice. Invariably, they will do it in the dead of night on the most difficult terrain. At the cutting edge of these squadrons are the scout sections and platoons that do the work of gaining and maintaining contact with the enemy. The Cobra Team has provided this tactical decision exercise (TDE) handbook as a tool to train cavalry leaders to think through these tactical problems and communicate clear, correct, and executable orders.

This handbook is designed to help squadron commanders facilitate repetitive, imaginative, and effective training. If employed as intended, it will enable commanders to train, assess, and certify scout platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, and senior scouts. This handbook can also help commanders teach and assess comprehension of those core fundamentals that must be mastered by all scout leaders and cavalry officers. These core fundamentals are intended to be executed in a classroom environment on a table top. Maps and placards are included in this handbook to facilitate this type of training venue. As platoons gain confidence, these exercises can be easily applied to sand tables or terrain models to increase the size and scope of the training audience.

Why are these low-tech, table-top TDEs still valid in an environment where a commander can leverage powerful live, virtual, and constructive systems such as the Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT) and Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES)? The answer is simple. These TDEs allow the commander to observe and assess how his scouts think. Strip away all distractions from virtual training environments. Strip away the pressures of time and space in live force-on-force training. Slow down the tempo of the operation, and watch the young leader think through a complex tactical problem.

Although this handbook has TDEs that are carefully designed to focus on a specific fundamental of reconnaissance or security, it should not be interpreted as a how-to manual. Commanders should stress in the application of TDEs that there is not a correct answer to the tactical problem. Army doctrine should guide tactical decisions, but the problem-solving process and the team work of the platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and senior scout are the real measures of effectiveness. Commanders should allow and reward trial and error. If a leader makes a decision that causes tactical failure, let it play out, teach the lesson, then reset the placards and begin again.

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Finally, although this handbook has been prepared by the Cobra Team and is heavily informed by observation of innumerable squadrons, it must not be interpreted as a primer for a National Training Center rotation. It is designed to increase the effectiveness of scout leaders in combat.

Chapter 1

Fundamentals of Reconnaissance and Security

This handbook gives squadron commanders a tool to dive into the weighty Field Manual (FM) 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations, 01 JUL 2015, that defines the fundamentals of reconnaissance and security with platoon leaders. What does “gain and maintain enemy contact” really mean to a scout platoon leader? How does he actually do it? What happens if he does not do it?

An Army professional is a Soldier or Civilian who meets the Army profession's certification criteria in character, competence, and commitment. The Profession of Arms requires professional Soldiers to establish and uphold the discipline and standards of their art and science, including the responsibility for professional development and certification.¹

Unified land operations describe how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability tasks in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution. Reconnaissance and security operations are essential to effective execution of unified land operations.²

The U.S. Cavalry performs reconnaissance and security operations. The core competencies of cavalry forces are to conduct reconnaissance and security in close contact with enemy forces and civilian populations.³ Professional cavalrymen require professional certification from the squadron commander on their ability to make competent and fast decisions, grounded in thorough understanding of the fundamentals of reconnaissance and security.

Reconnaissance Fundamentals

There are seven fundamentals that govern planning and executing of reconnaissance tasks.⁴

1. Ensure Continuous Reconnaissance

Brigade combat teams (BCTs) require continuous information collection throughout all phases and critical events of all operations. Commanders direct information collection throughout all operations and task-organize cavalry assets to collect required information leading to more informed identification and execution of branches and sequels. Continuous reconnaissance provides commanders with a constant flow of information in

close contact with the enemy and civilian populace to identify and seize key terrain and confirm or deny enemy composition, disposition, strength, and courses of action. Continuous reconnaissance also provides reaction time and maneuver space for unpredicted enemy actions.

2. Do Not Keep Reconnaissance Assets in Reserve

Continuous and focused collection efforts require an efficient mix and redundancy of reconnaissance assets. However, this does not mean all assets should be employed simultaneously. Commanders maximize employment of their reconnaissance assets to answer their commander's critical information requirements. BCTs task and position reconnaissance assets at the appropriate time and place, and in the right combination (human, sensor, and technical means) to maximize their impact, allow for timely analysis of information, and aide decision making at the appropriate echelon.

3. Orient on the Reconnaissance Objectives

Commanders direct reconnaissance efforts by establishing reconnaissance objectives with a specific task, purpose, and focus. Reconnaissance objectives can be a combination of terrain features, geographic areas, threats, or civil considerations that provide commanders the necessary information to answer priority intelligence requirements. Cavalry formations, task-organized to effectively accomplish their objectives, develop their scheme of maneuver to maximize their capability to collect the required information within assigned objectives.

4. Report All Information Rapidly and Accurately

Commanders develop plans and make decisions based on the analysis of information collected by subordinate units. The commander needs quick and accurate reports to make informed decisions on the proper application of his forces. Rapid reporting allows staffs the maximum time required to analyze information and make timely recommendations to the commander. Information requirements, tied to decision points with a latest time information is of value (LTIOV) date-time group, provide focus for units collecting information and ensure units report information to facilitate timely decisions.

5. Retain Freedom of Maneuver

Tactical mobility and maneuver fundamentally drive the success of reconnaissance tasks. Commanders and staffs consider task organization, movement techniques, and scheme of maneuver to retain the unit's ability to maneuver. Reconnaissance tasks confirm or deny assumptions about the terrain and enemy made during mission analysis and intelligence preparation of the battlespace. This helps to identify opportunities and maintain agile freedom of maneuver for the BCT. Effective counter

reconnaissance operations retain freedom of maneuver by denying enemy collection efforts and identifying opportunities for the command to seize, retain, and exploit initiative. Commanders change movement techniques and employ multiple assets to make contact with the smallest possible element and avoid becoming decisively engaged. Commanders retain freedom of maneuver by avoiding decisive engagement with a superior force and develop the situation further, while consistently balancing the requirement to maintain contact with retaining freedom of maneuver.

6. Gain and Maintain Enemy Contact

Cavalry forces find and sustain contact with the enemy on terms and conditions of their choosing. Using at least one of the eight forms of contact, commanders and staffs plan for and integrate aerial and ground sensors; manned platforms and unmanned systems; dismounted operations; signals, image, and human intelligence; and visual observation to gain contact with the enemy using the smallest element possible. Intelligence units can provide a wide array of support to assist cavalry forces in detecting and tracking the enemy such as imagery and full motion video provided by an unmanned aircraft system or geolocation provided by signals intelligence collectors. Once units make contact, cavalry forces maintain contact until specific orders are given, a change of mission occurs when disengagement or displacement criteria dictate, or the unit conducts reconnaissance handover with another unit. Maintaining contact with the enemy provides real-time information of the enemy's composition, disposition, strength, and actions allowing staffs to analyze and make recommendations to the commander based on current intelligence.

7. Develop the Situation Rapidly

Cavalry forces act instinctively and urgently to increase the commander's situational understanding of the terrain, enemy, and civilian populace. Effective cavalry forces understand how time impacts movement (both friendly and enemy) and how timely collection of intelligence requirements impacts the commander's decisions. The reconnaissance scheme of maneuver and tempo matches the requisite urgency to answer the necessary information requirements. Cavalry forces collect on directed reconnaissance objectives in close contact with civilian populations, while selectively choosing to fight enemy forces to determine intent, disposition, composition, and strength.

Security Fundamentals

There are five fundamentals of security. The fundamentals of security, like the fundamentals of reconnaissance, provide a framework for security operations. Reconnaissance operations, because they are continuous throughout all operations to develop the situation through information collection, are essential to successful security operations. The fundamentals of reconnaissance are applicable to security operations and are necessary to ensure successful execution.

1. Provide Early and Accurate Warning

The squadron or protecting unit detects, orients upon, and observes threat forces that can influence the BCT. Early detection and warning through rapid reporting enables the BCT commander to make timely and well-informed decisions for the proper application of his forces on the observed threat.

2. Provide Reaction Time and Maneuver Space

As with the fundamental of “Provide Early and Accurate Warning,” the ability for the cavalry squadron to gain and maintain contact and report accurately rapidly affords the BCT commander the time and space to make an informed decision to employ forces. Reaction time and maneuver space relates to the decision points driven by information requirements and indicators given LTIOV parameters. These factors ensure the commander makes decisions that place maximum firepower at the decisive point in a timely manner.

3. Orient on the Protected Force, Area, or Facility

While reconnaissance operations orient on the reconnaissance objective, security operations focus on the protected force by understanding the scheme of maneuver and follow-on mission. By understanding the BCT’s required actions and movement, the squadron maneuvers to best provide reaction time and maneuver space, which allow for timely decisions.

4. Perform Continuous Reconnaissance

Squadron or maneuver battalions continuously seek the enemy and reconnoiter key terrain. Through continuous reconnaissance, forces continue to gain and maintain enemy contact, develop the situation, report rapidly and accurately, retain freedom of maneuver to provide early and accurate warning, and provide reaction time and maneuver space to the protected force. Therefore, the fundamentals of reconnaissance are implicit in all security operations. Commanders use the same reconnaissance methods, management, and techniques.

5. Maintain Enemy Contact

Real-time and accurate information requires cavalry forces to gain and maintain contact with the enemy to rapidly report their actions, and provide reaction time and maneuver space. Like the reconnaissance fundamental “Gain And Maintain Enemy Contact,” maintaining enemy contact through one or more of the forms of contact enables the staff to make recommendations to the commander; generate options; identify opportunities; and seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

Endnotes

1. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 1, *The Army Profession*, 14 JUN 2015.
2. Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, 10 OCT 2011.
3. FM 3-98, *Reconnaissance and Security Operations*, 01 JUL 2015.
4. Ibid.

Chapter 2

How Cavalrymen Decide

Decision-making skills are developed through practice. The lower the level of command, the simpler, faster, more direct, and accelerated the decision-making process. The ability to rapidly develop solutions to new problems is based on pattern recognition.

Decision-Making Processes

Analytical Decision Making. The classical model of decision making is a rational and systematic process of analysis based on a comparison of multiple options. If all information is accurate and all pertinent information is known, the analytical decision-making process guarantees the best possible decision is made. This analytical decision-making model works well if the facts are not variable, the decision-making environment is held constant, there are no time constraints, and human factors are limited to personal values. This is your squadron's deliberate military decisionmaking process (MDMP) and the troop leading procedures in your troops and platoons. During cavalry operations, this perfect analytical decision-making process is challenged by a constantly changing environment where not all the information is available, fatigue and other stress is normal, and time is always limited. This handbook focuses on the second, more intuitive process of decision making.

Intuitive Decision Making. The essential factor in intuitive decision making is experience. Experience allows recognition of similarities to previous situations. A pattern of typical cause and effect develops to allow a decision that does not require extensive analysis or reason. The more experience gained in applying a variety of patterns, the more likely the cavalry leader will know what to do. This handbook aims at giving platoon leaders more experience through (albeit) low-tech simulations.

Tactical Decision Exercises and Decision Making

Tactical decision exercises (TDEs) provide a simple, adaptable, and effective method of repeatedly challenging a cavalry leader with tactical situations that include limitations of time and information. By requiring a decision regarding the situation and the ability to communicate it in the form of clear instructions (operation order [OPORD] or fragmentary order [FRAGORD]), the scout leader will gain precious experience and skill in actual tactical decision making.

There is no substitute for the experience of live training. However, simulations provide low-cost repetitions for decision making in times of limited resources. Pattern recognition skills can be improved, and tactical decision making can be practiced and refined. TDEs are role-playing exercises designed to place individuals in a contested, ambiguous decision space. Reasons for conducting TDEs include:

- Practice the decision-making process
- Practice communicating decisions to others
- Ready-made or easily adaptable professional certification vehicle

Because the purpose of TDEs is to build breadth of experience in decision making and communication, it is important to employ this process frequently at the platoon leadership level. In addition to developing individual decision-making skills, the practice allows platoon leaders to learn from each other and to gain an understanding of how each leader makes decisions. Each war game conducted, similar to every live-zone reconnaissance, will add to the collective reservoir of experience in the squadron's platoon leadership.

Chapter 3

How Squadron Commanders Certify Platoon Leaders With Tactical Decision Exercises

Tactical decision exercises (TDEs) are inherently simple; so keep them simple.

Role Playing. The platoon leader is put into the role of leading his own platoon in a given situation, with given resources, and a concise scenario. Add to or subtract elements as needed. If schoolhouse instructors are using this handbook, assign leadership roles and resources as necessary.

Limited Information. The platoon leader will not have as much information about the scenario as he might like. This is an important feature of the TDEs — uncertainty. Confusion and complications are basic characteristics of tactical decision making. Cavalrymen thrive in ambiguity.

Limited Time. The platoon leader will have limited time to make decisions and communicate those instructions.

Face a Dilemma. The platoon leader will face situations requiring actual decisions — a problem requiring a solution. The platoon leader's framework is the fundamentals of reconnaissance and security. Despite the above limitations, he must work out feasible, suitable, and acceptable solutions inside the framework.

After Action Review (AAR). AARs are the dynamic link between task performance and execution to standard. They provide commanders a critical assessment tool to plan Soldier, leader, and unit training. Through the professional and candid discussion of events, Soldiers can compare their performance against the standard and identify specific ways to improve proficiency.¹

Rules and Basics of Tactical Decision Exercises

Time Limit. Cavalry operations often contain time limitation pressures. Therefore, a time limit during these simulations is appropriate. Leaders should feel they have less time than they need to make decisions.

Decisions as Instructions. Operation orders (OPORDs) and fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs) are the correct ways to express tactical decisions in addition to combat reporting. Therefore, TDE solutions should take the same form. There is a difference between briefing the boss on “what I would do,” and tactical orders and reporting. Leaders will be expected to explain their decisions afterward in the AAR. However, the rule during the TDE is decide first, give an order or report, and explain later in the AAR.

Reward Creativity. There are a number of ways to solve tactical problems. The Army Training Network and Combined Arms Training Strategy resources are baselines for training and evaluation outlines (T&EOs). Creativity is a prized trait of cavalrymen. Assess platoon leaders' ability to translate the T&EO standards into real solutions. The observer coach/trainers of Cobra Team have included exercise controller instructions in this handbook only to assist squadron commanders in conducting these simulations. Cobra Team has emphasized key points of the T&EO in these instructions for squadron commanders' consideration.

Stay in Character. For realism, everyone participating simply plays his role. In most cases, the role assigned is the tactical role held by those participating. Simply react to the situation and communicate as in combat.

Endnote

1. Army Training Network. *A Leader's Guide to After Action Reviews (AARs)*, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, December 2013.

Chapter 4

How to Facilitate Tactical Decision Exercises

The squadron commander (SCO) may want to personally facilitate tactical decision exercises (TDEs). However, as the senior trainer of platoon leaders, he also may assign the troop commander to facilitate his platoon leaders' missions. This gives the SCO the freedom to observe, assess, and certify without having to run the exercises. Depending on who is responsible for the tactics portion of the SCO's platoon leader certification program, the SCO might also assign facilitator duties to the operations staff officer (S-3) or other staff officer. Instructors for the Armor Basic Officer Leaders Course (ABOLC), Army Reconnaissance Course (ARC), Senior Leader Course (SLC), Advanced Leaders Course (ALC), and other instructors may facilitate the TDEs in their classrooms.

Facilitator's Responsibilities. Facilitating TDEs or any vignette is a skill. It is a dynamic learning tool that can be demanding on the facilitator. Remember, the deliberate planning training objectives of the squadron are not obtained with TDEs. This is vignette training, consisting of snippets of tactical situations given to platoon leaders to force decisions with best known information.

Prepare for the Simulation. The facilitator must have a thorough knowledge of the fundamentals of reconnaissance and security. He must understand the objectives the SCO wants to accomplish and the standards (training and evaluation outline, squadron standard operating procedures [SOPs], or other) used for evaluation. He must be prepared to address a variety of possible decisions made by the platoon leaders.

Establish Delivery Platform. Print the included scenario, enemy and friendly placards, and establish the exercise table with the plotted large map. Have any necessary squadron products ready to use such as squadron tactical SOPs, report formats, etc. If for official certification, ensure the platoon leader submits his certification checklist to the SCO before the exercise.

Explain Rules. Issue simple rules of the exercise (for example, communicate decisions as instructions).

Orient the Participants. Orient the group participants to the map and explain the meaning of all props. The facilitator should answer questions about the scenario layout, which the platoon leaders would reasonably have knowledge of. However, the facilitator should not eliminate all uncertainties. "That is unknown" is a reasonable answer to many questions. "That is a good question. I will assign a specially trained, organized, and equipped scout platoon to figure that out" is slightly more passive

aggressive, but gets the point across to a resisting platoon leader. The SCO may choose to personally give the commander's intent to enhance the vignette's given scenario slightly.

Be Prepared and Have Tactical Knowledge. In order to lead the discussion and provide a useful after action review, the facilitator must know the subject matter. This skill is especially important because there are usually several ways for platoon leaders to solve a tactical dilemma. The facilitator must be familiar with the particular scenario and be able to discuss it intelligently. While recognizing there are several right answers that could actually work on the ground, facilitators must also identify plans that would obviously fail or are not safe or tactically sound. Preparing discussion points for common solutions and for obviously unsound or unsafe solutions is recommended.

Adapt to the Unexpected. Because these vignettes are "free play," the facilitator must maintain situational awareness in order to adapt to unexpected changes. Cavalrymen will invariably have unexpected questions or solutions. The discussion will present unexpected opportunities that provide impromptu lessons about key tactical concepts. The facilitator must adapt quickly to unforeseen circumstances resulting from platoon leader developed plans or contingencies. The facilitator must provide additional inputs (either constraints, additional objectives, or the SCO could refine his commander's intent), if necessary, to gain the training objective.

TDEs are Time-Compressed Scenarios. Provide frequent "time tags." It is a good practice to remind platoon leaders how much time has passed throughout the phases of the vignette. The facilitator uses his knowledge and experience to assist the platoon leader. For example, a 15-kilometer route reconnaissance takes more than 20 minutes. The facilitator can keep the platoon leader abreast of the timing as he moves through zone by stating "one hour has expired, two hours have expired," etc.

Timeouts or Suspension of Battlefield Effects. Timeouts or suspensions are necessary, at times, to keep the group focused on the learning objectives. This technique, however, should not be used frequently. The facilitator should clarify the situation and resume action as quickly as possible.

Chapter 5

How to Conduct After Action Reviews

Effective after action reviews (AARs) are a reflection of the commander and his role in training. AARs foster an environment of trust, collaboration, initiative, and a co-creation of context necessary among Soldiers and leaders in decentralized operations. Soldiers learn and understand the commander's intent and act decisively while accepting prudent risks.

AARs used during training include the same four parts as AARs used during operations.

Review what was supposed to occur. The facilitator and participants review what was supposed to occur. This review is based on the commander's intent, training objectives, and tasks to train. This information is usually found in the operation order or on the training schedule.

Establish what happened. The facilitator and participants determine to the extent possible what actually occurred during the training event, phase, or the operation. The leader attempts to gather as many views or perspectives (opposing forces, squad leader, team leader, rifleman, etc.) as feasible and possible. This helps establish a common understanding and instill operational adaptability. Leaders can then understand the complexity of an event and work to solve complex, ill-defined problems quickly.

Determine what was right or wrong with what happened. Participants then establish the strong and weak points of their performance based on the commander's intent and performance measures. The facilitator guides discussions to ensure maximum input is operationally sound and relevant to the training event.

Determine how the task should be done differently next time. The facilitator guides the unit in determining how the tasks might be performed more effectively in the future. The unit identifies problems, provides solutions, and identifies who will make those solutions. Additionally, the facilitator guides the discussion to determine if there is a more effective way to train the tasks to achieve the commander's intent.

For more information see, *A Leader's Guide to After Action Reviews (AARs)*, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Army Training Network, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, December 2013.

Appendix A

Reconnaissance and Security Vignettes

Vignette 1. Ensure Continuous Reconnaissance

You are a scout platoon leader and your troop commander tasked your platoon with conducting reconnaissance of named areas of interest (NAIs) 5050 and 5052, which affect an expected avenue of approach (AoA) for the enemy's exploitation force. You must also confirm or deny the enemy's use of AoA DODGE. You need to gather information about the utility of AoA DODGE as a viable attack route. You also need to provide composition, disposition, strength, and orientation of the enemy exploitation force using AoA DODGE. The mission is to prevent the enemy from surprising the brigade combat team (BCT) before, during, and after its defensive operations

The enemy recently moved south from its defense and is expected to attack the BCT. The enemy has two templated courses of action (COAs), one of which is the use of AoA DODGE. Within AoA DODGE, main supply route (MSR) BUD travels through a small pass and is canalizing terrain for forces using the pass. The enemy wants to gain a foothold on the pass to allow the exploitation force to breach the BCT's obstacles. The enemy's decisive point is breaching the BCT's obstacles. The enemy is supported by two 120mm mortars and engineers to reduce obstacles. Observation posts (OPs) consist of four to six individuals with medium machine guns and antitank weapon systems. The enemy has a company in reserve 10 kilometers to the north of phase line (PL) JETS.

Your BCT is defending east of PL CHIEFS for the purpose of generating combat power to transition to the offense. It is important that you identify the exploitation force so that the BCT can confirm the enemy's timeline and prepare its defense. The BCT's Shadow unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is flying in support of the squadron's decisive operation north of PL JETS. You will only have the organic troop's Raven UAV. Your platoon is second in priority of troop mortars and is tasked with providing two troop mortar targets. Your BCT is depending on your reconnaissance to determine the enemy's COA. You have 10 minutes to issue an order to your platoon.

Act now!




Figure A-1. Ensure continuous reconnaissance

What Does “Ensure Continuous Reconnaissance” Mean?

“BCTs require continuous information collection throughout all phases and critical events of all operations. Commanders direct information collection throughout all operations and task organize cavalry assets to collect required information leading to more informed identification and execution of branches and sequels. Continuous reconnaissance provides commanders with a constant flow of information in close contact with the enemy and civilian populace to identify and seize key terrain; confirm or deny enemy composition, disposition, strength and COAs; and provides reaction time and maneuver space for unpredicted enemy actions.”

— **Field Manual 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations, 01 JUL 2015**

The commander conducts reconnaissance before, during, and after all operations to provide updated information that verifies the enemy’s composition, dispositions, and intentions as the battle progresses.

When current operational information is adequate, reconnaissance elements gather information for branches and sequels to current plans. At a minimum, reconnaissance is conducted continuously as part of all security missions, including the conduct of local security for forces not in contact.

Indicators of Success

- The platoon leader plans for long-duration observation. Mixing mounted and dismounted OPs for depth and focusing on priorities of work to maintain combat power.
- The platoon leader has an observation plan before, during, and after BCT operations.
- The platoon dedicates appropriate assets and gives each observation platform a task and purpose.
- OPs have multiple vantage points and can observe the entirety of the objective.
- The platoon leader constantly reassesses his understanding of the situation. As he progresses through zone, he develops an understanding that the enemy places value on this route and has shown willingness to fight for the terrain.

- Although the platoon leader does not make contact with his templated enemy, he continues his reconnaissance (even as the BCT begins its defense) in order to create space and time and prevent the BCT from being surprised by an enemy force in his assigned area.
- The platoon leader understands the often competing demands of risk to the mission versus risk to his unit.

Indicators of Failure

- The platoon leader does not prioritize reconnaissance guidance and priorities of work to maximize his combat power at the appropriate time.
- The platoon leader does not allocate appropriate assets to all phases of operations.
- The platoon leader does not assign task and purpose of all organic units or attachments.
- The platoon leader does not coordinate with adjacent units to cover dead space that cannot be viewed by the platoon.
- OPs are established so the observation platforms cannot observe the entire objective.
- The platoon leader's understanding of the situation is not changed by his reconnaissance; he conducts tasks without a linked regard for purpose and does not build situational understanding as conditions change.
- The platoon leader repositions to positions that cannot prevent the BCT from being surprised by an enemy force using MSR BUD.

Vignette 2: Do Not Keep Reconnaissance Assets in Reserve

You are a scout platoon leader and your troop is tasked to conduct an area reconnaissance of named areas of interest (NAIs) 3030 and 3032 to identify the enemy's defensive preparations to include obstacles, battle positions, and general locations of key weapons systems. Your platoon is currently executing a screen south of phase line (PL) BULLS.

The enemy has recently conducted a series of attacks north of the brigade combat team (BCT) area of operations (AO). These attacks have pushed the BCT south of PL BULLS. The enemy is anticipating that your BCT is building combat power and will attempt to attack. The enemy has established a deliberate defense 3 kilometers north of PL BUCKS and is actively improving its position. The enemy's defense is supported by two to three observation posts (OPs) to provide early warning, a section of 120mm mortars, and engineers to provide fighting positions and obstacles. The enemy has a company in reserve 10 kilometers northeast of its defense. The reserve will be dispatched when a battalion loses three or more platoons, or two platoons and one of their engineer assets.

Your BCT commander does not know the location of the enemy obstacles, battle positions, and any antitank weapon systems. The BCT will attack in 24 hours. You have 12 hours to develop the situation and identify the obstacles and the enemy battle positions to enable the BCT to destroy the enemy. You are the priority of fires for troop mortars and are allotted two mortar targets. You have the troop's Raven unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and a dismounted engineer reconnaissance team you can employ to support your platoon. You also have a Prophet team consisting of three high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) mounted systems that can directionally find the enemy based on intercepting radio transmissions. You have 10 minutes to issue a fragmentary order (FRAGORD) and begin your reconnaissance.

Act now!




Figure A-2. Do not keep reconnaissance assets in reserve

What Does “Do Not Keep Reconnaissance Assets in Reserve” Mean?

“Continuous and focused collection efforts require an efficient mix and redundancy of reconnaissance assets; however, this does not mean to employ all assets simultaneously. Commanders maximize employment of their reconnaissance assets to answer their commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs). BCTs task and position reconnaissance assets at the appropriate time, place, and in the right combination (human, sensor, and technical means) to maximize their impact, allow for timely analysis of information, and aide decision making at the appropriate echelon.”

— **Field Manual 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations, 01 JUL 2015**

Reconnaissance assets are never kept in reserve. When committed, reconnaissance assets use all their resources to accomplish the mission. This does not mean that all assets are committed all the time.

The commander uses available reconnaissance assets based on their capabilities and the mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) to achieve the maximum coverage needed to answer the CCIRs. At times, this requires the commander to withhold or position reconnaissance assets to ensure that they are available at critical times and places. Commanders consider all reconnaissance assets as committed assets with specific missions at all times.

Indicators of Success

- The platoon uses a combination of dismounted and mounted observation posts to gain tactical depth.
- The platoon leader briefs a plan that gives every maneuver unit and attachment a task and purpose.
- The platoon organic and attached OP platforms are given a task and purpose — not necessary for all to be used at the same time — and positioned in a manner that gives the platoon its best observation.
- OP establishment and priorities of work are accomplished and allow for maximum observation.
- There is coordination with adjacent units to cover dead space.
- There is an integrated fires plan to support the maneuver.

Indicators of Failure

- The platoon leader does not use dismounts.
- The platoon uses a linear screen and does not gain all vantage points necessary to answer information requirements.
- The platoon leader does not assign reconnaissance task and purpose of all organic units or attachments.
- The platoon and sections do not execute priorities of work or OP establishment in a timely manner and remove observation assets from the fight.

Vignette 3: Orient on the Reconnaissance Objective

You are a scout platoon leader and your troop is conducting a zone reconnaissance from phase line (PL) HOUSTON to PL MIAMI to allow the brigade combat team (BCT) freedom of maneuver. The troop commander has identified the following key tasks: neutralize enemy reconnaissance, identify enemy defensive positions along axis COPPER, and conduct forward passage of lines (FPOL) with the BCT decisive operation along axis COPPER. Your reconnaissance objective is to identify the enemy obstacles.

The squadron S-2 estimates that the enemy reconnaissance screens between PL LOS ANGELES and PL MIAMI to identify the BCT decisive operation's axis of advance. Named areas of interest (NAIs) 1040 and 1045 coincide with templated enemy observation posts (OPs). The S-2 asserts that the enemy main body will develop engagement areas along axis COPPER in the vicinity of either NAI 1065 or NAI 1070 and consists of a mechanized infantry battalion, supported by counter mobility and survivability engineering assets. The enemy will likely emplace fixing and disrupting obstacles.

The squadron has priority of fires in the BCT until the main body crosses the line of departure (LD) and your troop has priority of fires in the squadron. Your platoon has priority of fires in the troop. You have 10 minutes to issue an order.

Act now!




Figure A-3. Orient on the reconnaissance objective

What Does “Orient on the Reconnaissance Objective” Mean?

“Commanders direct reconnaissance efforts by establishing reconnaissance objectives with a specific task, purpose, and focus. Reconnaissance objectives can be a combination of terrain features, geographic areas, threat, enemy, adversaries, or civil considerations that provide commanders the necessary information to answer priority intelligence requirements. Cavalry formations, task-organized to effectively accomplish their objectives, develop their scheme of maneuver to maximize their capability to collect the required information within the assigned objectives.”

— **Field Manual 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations,**
01 JUL 2015

Cavalry formations set conditions for successful operations of the unit for which they conduct reconnaissance. They accomplish this by providing information requirements that drive decisions about how the maneuver commander will deploy his formation. Cavalry leaders possess the understanding of the maneuver commander’s potential decision points and aggressively seek to inform and make recommendations to them.

Indicators of Success

- The platoon leader plans observation on NAIs rather than key terrain with superior lines of sight.
- The platoon leader adjusts the scheme of maneuver to ensure the platoon has observation of NAIs or to answer priority information requirements (PIRs).
- The platoon leader issues an obstacle report in accordance with the unit standard operating procedure (SOP).
- The platoon leader answers intelligence requirements concerning enemy engagement areas.
- The platoon leader recommends refinement to FPOL graphic control measures based on understanding of enemy defenses.
- The platoon leader does not make enemy contact and continues to orient on the reconnaissance objective.
- The platoon leader continues reconnaissance and requests to move past his limit of advance (LOA) to achieve the reconnaissance objective.

Indicators of Failure

- The platoon leader becomes fixed and indecisive at the lack of indicators on the NAI, halting his formation's reconnaissance operation.
- The platoon leader allows enemy contact to distract him from orienting on the reconnaissance objective.
- The platoon leader does not identify enemy obstacles.
- The platoon leader stops at his LOA and does not identify the enemy obstacles.

Vignette 4. Report All Information Rapidly and Accurately

Your scout platoon is the decisive operation for your troop. Your mission is to conduct an area reconnaissance of named area of interest (NAI) 2005 to determine enemy presence and determine if it is suitable for a combined arms battalion (CAB) to pass through. The brigade combat team (BCT) attacks in 24 hours and the engineer platoon assigned to this pass currently has one mine-clearing line charge (MICLIC) and needs to have a description of any obstacles present within eight hours to prepare additional MICLICs. This will give the engineer platoon 16 hours to finish preparations for a breach, if necessary. The squadron has priority of fires in the BCT until the main body line of departure (LD). Your troop has priority of fires in the squadron. Your platoon has priority of fires in the troop. Your platoon is currently arrayed in multiple operations east of phase line (PL) AVALANCHE overlooking the eastern opening of the pass.

The enemy scouts have conducted reconnaissance in zone for the past 24 hours. Winds have been minimal and optimal conditions exist for unmanned aircraft system (UAS) employment. During your planning, you are able to watch the Shadow UAS feed on your troop's One System Remote Video Terminal (OSRVT). You identify a one-wheeled vehicle in the pass behind an obstacle estimated to be 75 meters in depth with the OSRVT.

You have eight hours to assess the enemy and determine the suitability of the pass, or the CAB could potentially be out of the fight without a viable point of penetration. You have 10 minutes to issue an order and execute.

Act now!




Figure A-4. Report all information rapidly and accurately

What Does“Report all Information Rapidly and Accurately” Mean?

“Commanders develop plans and make decisions based on the analysis of information collected by subordinate units. Quick and accurate reports are required for the commander to make informed decisions on the proper application of his forces. Rapid reporting allows staffs maximum time to analyze information and make timely recommendations to the commander. Information requirements tied to decision points with a latest time information of value (LTIOV) date-time group provide focus for units collecting information and ensure units report information to facilitate timely decisions.”

— **Field Manual 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations, 01 JUL 2015**

Scout platoons directly contributed to the BCT planning cycle (can a CAB use this approach march route) and BCT commander decision.

As a result of scout platoons not reporting all information rapidly and accurately, the BCT plans in a vacuum without the information needed and the BCT commander is forced to make command decisions without the appropriate level of detail needed.

Indicators of Success

- The platoon leader plans for long-duration observation, mixing mounted and dismounted observation posts (OPs) for depth and focusing on priorities of work to maintain combat power.
- The platoon leader has an observation plan before, during, and after BCT operations.
- The platoon dedicates appropriate assets and gives each observation platform a task and purpose.
- OPs have multiple vantage points and can observe the entirety of the objective.
- The platoon leader constantly reassesses his understanding of the situation. As he progresses through the zone, he develops an understanding that the enemy places value on this route and has shown willingness to fight for the terrain.
- The platoon leader understands the often competing demands of risk to the mission versus risk to his unit.

- The platoon leader issues a route report in unit format, or, at a minimum, the platoon leader reports traffic ability, enemy situation, and identified hazards.
- The platoon leader reports a Blue 9 Obstacle Report and Blue 10 Bypass Report in accordance with the unit standard operating procedure (SOP).
- The platoon leader understands the latest time the information is of value.
- The tempo aligns with the amount of time the platoon leader has after he conducts his time-distance analysis.

Indicators of Failure

- The platoon leader does not prioritize reconnaissance guidance and priorities of work to maximize combat power at the appropriate time.
- The platoon leader does not allocate appropriate assets to all phases of operations.
- The platoon leader does not assign task and purpose of all organic units or attachments.
- The platoon leader does not coordinate with adjacent units to cover dead space that cannot be viewed by the platoon.
- OPs are established so the observation platforms cannot observe the entire objective.
- The platoon leader's understanding of the situation is not changed by his reconnaissance; he conducts tasks without a linked regard for purpose and does not build situational understanding as conditions change.
- The platoon leader fails to properly describe the obstacle. As a result, the engineers do not prepare a second MICLIC.
- The platoon leader makes no attempt to locate a bypass.
- The platoon leader makes no attempt to conduct reconnaissance on key terrain to identify enemy overwatch.

Vignette 5. Retain Freedom of Maneuver

You are a scout platoon leader and your troop is conducting reconnaissance from phase line (PL) BUDWEISER to PL FOSTERS to allow the brigade combat team's (BCT's) decisive operation freedom of maneuver. The BCT commander decided that main supply route (MSR) GEORGIA is his primary attack axis for the decisive operation maneuver battalion in 18 hours. You must destroy enemy reconnaissance within your capabilities, identify enemy defensive positions along MSR GEORGIA, and execute the forward passage of lines (FPOL) with BCT decisive operations along MSR GEORGIA when the BCT attacks. Your reconnaissance objective is to shape the enemy disruption zone around MSR GEORGIA. You must make it suitable for at least one maneuver battalion to reach the enemy defensive obstacles and conduct breaching operations at PL FOSTERS.

The enemy is screening from PL COORS to PL FOSTERS to protect its eastern flank. The screening force will fight your scout platoon to retain key terrain in the vicinity of named areas of interest (NAIs) 1005, 1006, and 1008. The enemy will use dismounted observation posts and hasty battle positions consisting of antitank guided missiles (ATGMs). NAI 1010 likely contains an enemy battle position and a disruption obstacle along MSR GEORGIA. Presence of the disruption obstacle, two or more tracked vehicles, and/or greater than a squad of dismounted infantry in NAI 1010 indicate the enemy main defensive area.

Your BCT is preparing to attack and is assembled well west of PL BUDWEISER. It is important that you confirm or deny the utility of MSR GEORGIA as a viable attack route. The BCT Shadow unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is observing farther in depth, attempting to locate the enemy tactical assembly area, but you have your troop's Raven UAV. The BCT commander wants to limit exposure of his fires battalion until the decisive operations, but your platoon is priority for troop mortars. Planning mortar targets will assist the troop fire support officer in positioning mortar firing points to support you. Your BCT is depending on your reconnaissance to pull the BCT into a position of advantage, unhindered by the enemy disruption zone. You have 10 minutes to issue an order to your platoon.

Act now!




Figure A-5. Retain freedom of maneuver

What Does “Retain Freedom of Maneuver” Mean?

“Tactical mobility and maneuver fundamentally drive the success of reconnaissance tasks. Commanders and staffs consider task organization, movement techniques, and scheme of maneuver to retain the unit’s ability to maneuver . . . Commanders change movement techniques and employ multiple assets to make contact with the smallest possible element and avoid becoming decisively engaged. Commanders retain freedom of maneuver by avoiding decisive engagement with a superior force and develop the situation further — consistently balancing the requirement to maintain contact with retaining freedom of maneuver.”

— *Field Manual 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations, 01 JUL 2015*

To conduct effective reconnaissance, cavalry formations require the ability to move around the battlefield to gain a position of advantage and/or develop the situation rapidly.

The formation cannot become fixed or decisively engaged such that it is unable to maneuver. Commanders and cavalry leaders ensure they retain the freedom to maneuver by analyzing the enemy situation and employing the proper movement techniques and formations to make contact on their terms. Additionally, they seek to make contact with the smallest possible element, employing all intelligence collection assets available to do so.

Indicators of Success

- The platoon leader requests products or intelligence from brigade-level information collection assets operating in the platoon’s area of operations.
- The platoon leader employs an unmanned aircraft system (UAS) to make contact with the smallest possible element.
- The platoon leader utilizes dismounts to make contact with the smallest possible element.
- The platoon leader employs fires to retain freedom of maneuver.
- The platoon leader seeks to employ long-range sensors in overwatch positions to gain visual contact.
- The platoon leader uses formations and movement techniques to reach a position of advantage.

- The platoon leader develops graphic control measures to control his formation and prevent from becoming decisively engaged at the same place and/or time.

Indicators of Failure

- The platoon leader fails to employ dismounts and the UAS to make contact with the smallest possible element where enemy contact is likely.
- The platoon leader, in the wrong formation, attempts to maneuver the entire platoon using traveling or traveling overwatch within direct fire weapons range of NAIs where the enemy is templated.
- The platoon leader attempts infiltration without overwatch within direct fire weapons range of NAIs where the enemy is templated.

Vignette 6. Gain and Maintain Enemy Contact

You are a scout platoon leader and your troop is conducting a zone reconnaissance from phase line (PL) HOUSTON to PL MIAMI to gather information about axis COPPER. The brigade combat team (BCT) commander is considering using axis COPPER during his attack in the next 24 hours. You must also neutralize enemy reconnaissance within your capabilities, identify enemy defensive positions along axis COPPER, and execute the forward passage of lines (FPOL) with the BCT decisive operations along axis COPPER, if the BCT uses this route. The purpose of your mission is to create maneuver space for the BCT decisive operation. Your reconnaissance objective is to find an axis of attack suitable for at least one maneuver battalion to use in order to reach the enemy defensive obstacles and conduct breaching operations.

The enemy reconnaissance screens between PL MIAMI and PL HOUSTON to protect its eastern flank. Named areas of interest (NAIs) 1040 and 1045 are templated enemy observation posts (OPs). The enemy main body will develop engagement areas along axis COPPER in the vicinity of either NAI 1065 or NAI 1070, consisting of a motorized infantry company supported by counter mobility and survivability engineering assets. The enemy will use blocking and disrupting obstacles.

Your BCT is preparing to attack and is assembled east of PL HOUSTON. It is important that you confirm or deny the utility of axis COPPER as a viable attack route. The BCT's Shadow unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is refitting, but you have your troop's Raven UAV. The fires battalion is repositioning and is currently not ready to fire, but your platoon is priority for troop mortars. Templating priority mortar targets will assist the troop fire support officer in positioning mortar firing points to support you. Your BCT is depending on your reconnaissance to pull the BCT into a position of advantage. You have 10 minutes to issue an order to your platoon.

Act now!




Figure A-6. Gain and maintain enemy contact

What Does “Gain and Maintain Enemy Contact” Mean?

“Cavalry forces find and sustain contact with the enemy and conditions of their choosing . . . Once units make contact, cavalry forces maintain contact until specific orders are given, a change of mission occurs when disengagement or displacement criteria dictate, or the unit conducts reconnaissance handover with another unit. Maintaining contact with the enemy provides real-time information of the enemy’s composition, disposition, strength, and actions that allow staffs to analyze and make recommendations to the commander based on current intelligence.”

— **Field Manual 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations, 01 JUL 2015**

Scout platoons gain and maintain contact to deny the enemy the initiative and prevent the enemy from having the ability to maneuver out of contact to a position of advantage.

Indicators of Success

- The platoon leader plans for long-duration observation, mixing mounted and dismounted operations for depth and focusing on priorities of work to maintain combat power.
- The platoon leader has an observation plan before, during, and after BCT operations.
- The platoon dedicates appropriate assets to each phase and gives each observation platform a task and purpose.
- OPs have multiple vantage points and can observe the entirety of the objective.
- The platoon leader constantly reassesses his understanding of the situation. As he progresses through his zone, he develops an understanding that the enemy places value on this route and has shown willingness to fight for the terrain.
- The platoon leader maneuvers to destroy the inferior force and makes contact with multiple forms of contact.
- The platoon leader analyzes the enemy and understands he has not made contact with the main defensive area and continues his reconnaissance.
- The platoon leader attempts to launch the troop’s Raven to seize the initiative and attempt to gain and maintain contact with the enemy.

- The platoon leader reaches his limit of advance (LOA) and does not make contact with the enemy. He requests to continue his reconnaissance to achieve his objective.
- The platoon leader understands the often competing demands of risk to the mission versus risk to his unit.
- The platoon leader reports the Blue 9 Obstacle Report and Blue 10 Bypass Report in accordance with the unit standard operating procedure (SOP) and ATP 3-20.98.

Indicators of Failure

- The platoon leader does not prioritize reconnaissance guidance and priorities of work to maximize his combat power at the appropriate time.
- The platoon leader does not allocate appropriate assets to all phases of operations.
- The platoon leader does not assign task and purpose of all organic units or attachments.
- The platoon leader does not coordinate with adjacent units to cover dead space that cannot be viewed by the platoon.
- OPs are established so the observation platforms cannot observe the entire objective.
- The platoon leader puts no thought into maneuver and executes a frontal attack.
- The platoon makes contact with antitank systems and does not understand how inferior the force is; the platoon leader reports he has identified the enemy's main defensive area.
- The enemy reconnaissance fixes the platoon and the platoon leader cannot gain the initiative.
- The platoon allows graphic control measures to dictate the platoon leader's execution and not the reconnaissance objective. He stops at PL MIAMI and does not gain and maintain contact with the enemy's main defensive area.

- The platoon leader's understanding of the situation is not changed by his reconnaissance; he conducts tasks without a linked regard for purpose and does not build situational understanding as conditions change.
- The platoon leader does not complete obstacle or bypass reports, does so in the incorrect format, or is missing information.

Vignette 7. Develop the Situation Rapidly

Your platoon is the decisive operation for your troop, tasked to conduct an area reconnaissance of named areas of interest (NAIs) 2020, 2025, and 2035 to identify the enemy's defensive preparations to include obstacles and battle positions. The brigade combat team (BCT) has created two separate courses of action (COAs). The squadron needs to identify a point of penetration and the BCT needs to execute the COA that will facilitate the most successful breach.

The enemy attacked and was defeated 48 hours prior and is now executing a deliberate defense with wire and mine obstacles, tank ditches, and dug-in battle positions. Winds have been extremely high and all unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) have been grounded for the last 48 hours. Scouts currently identify bulldozers operating south of hill 680 and can observe dust signatures to the southwest of hill 980. You are at the maximum range of your optics and cannot identify what they are digging. You cannot identify any other enemy vehicles.

The BCT attacks in 24 hours and will publish the operation order (OPORD) in 12 hours. The squadron has 10 hours to get the BCT to execute the COA. The commander later selects COA 1. The squadron has priority of fires in the BCT until the main body line of departure (LD). Your troop has priority of fires in the squadron. Your platoon has priority of fires in the troop. Your platoon is currently arrayed in a screen oriented west in a series of mounted and dismounted operations east of phase line (PL) ASTROS. You have to confirm or deny BCT COA 2. You have 10 hours to paint the enemy picture for the BCT, or the BCT could potentially attack an enemy prepared defensive position in restricted terrain. You have 10 minutes to issue an order and begin movement.

Act now!




Figure A-7. Develop the situation rapidly

What Does “Develop the Situation Rapidly” Mean?

“Cavalry forces act instinctively and urgently to increase the commander’s situational understanding of the terrain, enemy, and civilian populace. Effective cavalry forces understand how time impacts movement (both friendly and enemy) and how timely collection of intelligence requirements impacts the commander’s decisions. The reconnaissance scheme of maneuver and tempo matches the requisite urgency to answer the necessary information requirements. Cavalry forces collect on directed reconnaissance objectives in close contact with civilian populations while selectively choosing to fight enemy forces to determine intent, disposition, composition, and strength.”

— **Field Manual 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations,**
01 JUL 2015

Scout platoons that rapidly develop the situation allow the BCT commander to make informed decisions. The commander can then provide the BCT staff with actionable information that they can utilize.

When units do not develop the situation rapidly, then a window of maneuver space and time is available for the enemy to gain a tactical advantage. As a result, contact will not be made on friendly terms by the smallest element possible, and all success up to that point can be lost.

Indicators of Success

- The platoon leader plans for long-duration observation, mixing mounted and dismounted observation posts (OPs) for depth and focusing on priorities of work to maintain combat power.
- The platoon leader has an observation plan before, during, and after BCT operations.
- The platoon dedicates appropriate assets and gives each observation platform a task and purpose.
- OPs have multiple vantage points and can observe the entirety of the objective.
- The platoon leader constantly reassesses his understanding of the situation. As he progresses through zone, he develops an understanding that the enemy places value on this route and has shown willingness to fight for the terrain.

- The platoon leader understands the latest time the information is of value.
- The platoon leader understands the often competing demands of risk to mission versus risk to his unit.
- The platoon leader demonstrates a clear understanding of the decision the BCT commander has to make.
- The tempo aligns with the amount of time the platoon leader has after he conducts his time-distance analysis.

Indicators of Failure

- The platoon leader does not prioritize reconnaissance guidance and priorities of work to maximize his combat power at the appropriate time.
- The platoon leader does not allocate appropriate assets to all phases of operations.
- The platoon leader does not assign task and purpose of all organic units or attachments.
- The platoon leader sends a report with a recommendation of continuing to observe and not maneuvering to a position of advantage.
- OPs are established so the observation platforms cannot observe the entire objective.
- The platoon leader's understanding of the situation is not changed by his reconnaissance; he conducts tasks without a linked regard for purpose and does not build situational understanding as conditions change.
- The platoon movement technique and formation contradict tempo.
- The platoon leader does not understand the decisions the BCT commander has to make.
- The platoon leader does not understand the adjacent unit's task and purpose.

Vignette 8. Provide Early and Accurate Warning

You are a scout platoon leader and your troop commander tasked your platoon to screen from phase line (PL) AUSTIN to PL DALLAS on named areas of interest (NAIs) 2000, 2005, and 2010 to provide reaction time and maneuver space to the brigade combat team (BCT) preparing the defense. Your platoon is currently arrayed on the high ground west of PL CHICAGO oriented northeast. You must also confirm or deny the enemy's use of avenue of approach (AoA) SEGA and to identify composition and strength of the enemy. Your key tasks are to destroy enemy observation posts (OPs) in zone, find OP locations that provide effective observation along AoA SEGA, and report composition and strength of any enemy. The purpose of your mission is to identify the enemy as far out as possible to provide the BCT with two hours of reaction time. This will give the engineers time to finish their current task and move behind the defense.

The enemy has recently moved south from its defense and is expected to attack the BCT. The enemy has two templated axes of advance: AoA SEGA or AoA ATARI. The enemy wants to handrail the terrain as much as possible to allow for a concealed movement to the BCT's obstacle effort and will travel at approximately 20 kilometers per hour. The enemy's decisive point is breaching the BCT's defensive belt in the vicinity of PL AUSTIN. The enemy is supported by two 120mm mortars and engineers to reduce obstacles. The enemy has the capability to emplace OPs consisting of four to six individuals with medium machine guns and antitank weapon systems.

The BCT is defending south of PL AUSTIN to protect the northern flank of the division. The squadron S-2 is uncertain of the enemy's timeline. The BCT is preparing obstacles; it will need two hours early warning of the enemy attack in order to pull the bulldozers behind the defense. It is important that you properly identify enemy vehicles because the assault force will have engineer breaching assets. The assault force will follow the fixing force. There is no templated enemy armor within the fixing force. The S-2 templated that the first formation you observe with tanks is the formation that will have the breaching assets. The exploitation force will follow the assault force. Your platoon is second in the priority of troop mortars. You have two M180 demolition cratering kits and two Modular Pack Mine Systems (MOPMS). You have priority to direct your troop's Raven unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and you have priority of frequency modulation jamming asset (jams for 15 minutes and response time is 10 minutes to be on station). Your BCT is awaiting your reconnaissance to determine the enemy's course of action (COA). You have 10 minutes to develop your fragmentary order (FRAGORD).

Act now!




Figure A-8. Provide early and accurate warning

What Does “Provide Early and Accurate Warning” Mean?

“The squadron or protecting unit detects, orients upon, and observes threat forces that can influence the brigade combat team. Early detection and warning through rapid reporting enables the BCT commander to make timely and well-informed decisions for the proper application of his forces on the observed threat.”

— *Field Manual 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations*,
01 JUL 2015

The BCT commander and staff rely on the cavalry squadron to provide information and intelligence to fill holes in the plan and pull the commander toward a decision. The squadron must analyze reports from the troop to ensure accurate reporting to the BCT.

When the cavalry squadron cannot provide the information the BCT requires to make a decision, the squadron has failed. Early reporting is not always the most accurate. Therefore, initial reports need to be validated at every level as they come from the scout in the OP. The BCT is blind without the squadron. Entire maneuver plans often hinge on early reports from the squadron.

Indicators of Success

- The platoon leader plans for long-duration observation, mixing mounted and dismounted OPs for depth and focusing on priorities of work to maintain combat power.
- Based on the rate of march of the enemy, the platoon leader can figure out how much time is needed to delay the enemy. (The enemy has to move 20 kilometers, which will take an hour.) The platoon leader needs to delay the enemy for an additional hour to be successful.
- The platoon leader has an observation plan before, during, and after BCT operations.
- The platoon dedicates appropriate assets to each phase and gives each observation platform a task and purpose.
- OPs have multiple vantage points and can observe the entirety of the objective.
- The platoon leader constantly reassesses his understanding of the situation and gains observation east of NAI 2000 to observe deep into AoA SEGA.

- The platoon leader directs Raven employment to identify the enemy east of PL DALLAS.
- The platoon leader employs MOPMS, cratering charge, and jamming capability to delay the enemy. He also develops an obstacle plan (to emplace obstacles that are well spread out to ensure his platoon retains freedom of movement) and a displacement plan.
- The platoon leader uses depth to engage with multiple forms of contact (i.e., direct fire, indirect fire, electronic warfare, and Raven).
- Although he does not make contact with his template enemy, the platoon leader continues his reconnaissance, even as the BCT begins its defense to create space and time and prevent the surprise of the BCT through his assigned area.
- The platoon leader understands the often competing demands of risk to mission versus risk to his unit.

Indicators of Failure

- The platoon leader does not prioritize reconnaissance guidance and priorities of work to maximize his combat power at the appropriate time.
- The platoon leader does not allocate appropriate assets to all phases of operations.
- The platoon leader does not assign task and purpose to all organic units or attachments.
- The platoon leader does not maneuver sections to gain multiple vantage points on AoA SEGA.
- OPs are established so the observation platforms cannot observe the entire objective.
- The platoon leader's understanding of the situation is not changed by his reconnaissance; he conducts tasks without a linked regard for purpose and does not build situational understanding as conditions change.
- The platoon leader repositions to positions that cannot prevent the BCT from being surprised by a force using AoA SEGA.
- The platoon leader only maneuvers in a line formation.
- The platoon leader only attempts to engage with one form of contact.
- The platoon leader does not employ all assets (i.e., cratering charge, MOPMS, jamming, and Raven).

Vignette 9. Provide Reaction Time and Maneuver Space

You are the platoon leader in a troop currently positioned along phase line (PL) INDIANAPOLIS, tasked to screen to provide early warning to the brigade combat team's (BCT's) decisive operation. To the west, the BCT's decisive operation defends to fix the enemy in order to protect the division's eastern flank. The squadron is uncertain of where the BCT will establish its defensive positions and develop its engagement areas.

Your troop commander identified four key tasks: defeat the enemy reconnaissance in order to prevent the enemy from identifying friendly defensive positions, disrupt the enemy fixing force to prevent the enemy from massing combat power against the BCT decisive operation, screen to provide early warning of the enemy exploitation force's axis of advance, conduct a rearward passage of lines with the BCT decisive operation in order to attack and fix the enemy.

The BCT commander must make two decisions based on the information provided by the troop. The BCT commander seeks to prioritize and employ a family of scatterable mines (FASCAM) and indirect fire along the enemy assault force's axis of advance. Additionally, the BCT commander seeks to commit the BCT reserve to reinforce the battalion in contact with the enemy assault force.

The enemy assault force likely consists of nine tanks, 22 Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty (BMP) infantry fighting vehicles, a company-sized element of antitank guided missiles, two SA-6 mobile surface-to-air missile systems, and engineering assets to conduct a mechanized breach of obstacles. The antitank, air defense, and engineering assets are likely to be unique to and indicators of the enemy assault force.

You are responsible for screening, while focusing on identifying the enemy attack. Named areas of interest (NAIs) 3005, 3010, and 3015 correspond with likely enemy mounted observation posts (OPs), while NAI 3020 and 3025 correspond with likely avenues of approach (AoAs) by the enemy fixing, assault, and exploitation force. The squadron's limit of advance (LOA) is PL MIAMI, but the troop commander has stated his confidence in your ability to establish your platoon's OPs where you deem appropriate to accomplish the mission. You have 10 minutes to issue an order to your platoon.

Act now!




Figure A-9. Provide reaction time and maneuver space

What Does “Provide Reaction Time and Maneuver Space” Mean?

“As with ‘provide early and accurate warning,’ the ability for the cavalry squadron to gain and maintain contact and report accurately and rapidly affords the BCT commander the time and space to make an informed decision to employ forces. Reaction time and maneuver space relates to decision points driven by information requirements and indicators given last time information of value parameters to ensure the commander makes decisions that place maximum firepower at the decisive point in a timely manner.”

— **Field Manual 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations, 01 JUL 2011**

The scout platoon leader understands the relationship between intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), information collection, and decision making by commanders within the BCT.

Applying his understanding of the event template, the information collection matrix, and the BCT decision support matrix, the scout platoon leader seeks to answer information requirements in a manner to provide the BCT commander the time needed to commit combat power to defeat the enemy plan.

Indicators of Success

- The platoon leader conducts IPB to identify mobility corridors, refine NAIs, and template the potential enemy.
- The platoon leader provides security guidance to his platoon.
- The platoon leader plans mounted and dismounted OPs to maximize effectiveness of their screen.
- OPs are provided cover and concealment, while maintaining good observation of their assigned NAIs.
- The platoon leader positions OPs to answer information requirements in NAIs that best provide sufficient reaction time and maneuver space for the BCT commander to employ fires to disrupt the enemy and commit additional combat power (i.e., the BCT reserve). In doing so, he will achieve the desired effect on the enemy.
- The observation plan contains depth and redundancy to facilitate continuous reporting as the enemy attacks west into the BCT decisive operation engagement area.

Indicators of Failure

- The platoon leader fails to conduct IPB.
- The platoon leader fails to provide security guidance to his platoon.
- The platoon leader fails to assign primary and alternate observers for each NAI, does not disseminate priority information requirements or indicators for each NAI, and does not assign times to observe each NAI.
- The platoon positions OPs to answer information requirements in NAIs that provide insufficient reaction time and maneuver space, resulting in the BCT commander's inability to employ fires or commit additional combat power in a timely manner.
- The observation plan lacks depth, resulting in the platoon's inability to report on enemy movement through the BCT area of operations (AO) once bypassed or engaged and destroyed.

Vignette 10. Orient on the Protected Force, Area, or Facility

You are a scout platoon leader and your troop is tasked with conducting a screen along phase line (PL) BILL (limit of advance [LOA]) to provide early warning for a deliberate defense south of PL CINDY. Your platoon is currently arrayed between PL CHRIS and PL BILL oriented west. This will allow the brigade combat team (BCT) to prevent enemy forces from penetrating PL CINDY and seizing key terrain to the south. The BCT expects an enemy fixing force to attack along avenue of approach (AoA) HOUSTON in the next 48 hours. It consists of an armored reconnaissance platoon followed by two tank companies.

Your platoon's mission is to screen along PL BILL (LOA) to identify the enemy fixing force to provide early warning for the BCT. The purpose of this operation is to provide early warning to the combined arms battalions (CABs) established in battle positions along PL CINDY. Key tasks of this operation include: observe named areas of interest (NAIs) 2030 and 2035 for enemy movement along AoA HOUSTON, confirm or deny enemy composition and disposition, disrupt enemy forces in target areas of interest (TAIs) 3000 and 3005, and maintain 75 percent combat power.

Your platoon is first in priority for troop mortars. You have been allotted two mortar targets for planning. You possess the troop's organic Raven unmanned aircraft vehicle (UAV). Additionally, there is one sortie of AH-64 Apaches operating south of your platoon in support of an adjacent unit, but may support your troop if the enemy force is larger or attacks earlier than expected.

It is imperative that you correctly orient your platoon. This enables you to incorporate all information collection systems to rapidly and accurately identify the enemy, as well as disrupt the enemy within your capabilities. You must provide the BCT with time to prepare its defenses. You have 10 minutes to develop your fragmentary order (FRAGORD).

Act now!




Figure A-10. Orient on the protected force, area, or facility

What Does “Orient on the Protected Force, Area, or Facility” Mean?

“While reconnaissance operations orient on the reconnaissance objective, security operations focus on the protected force by understanding their scheme of maneuver and follow-on mission. By understanding BCT’s required actions and movement, the squadron maneuvers to best provide reaction time and maneuver space that allow for timely decisions.”

— **Field Manual 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations, 01 JUL 2015**

“The reconnaissance platoon focuses all of its actions on securing the protected force or facility, and providing maximum early warning of enemy activity. It operates between the protected force and known or suspected enemy elements. The reconnaissance platoon moves as the protected force moves.”

— **Army Techniques Publication 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon, 05 APR 2013**

The commander arrays his platoons to best protect the security objective. Platoons may be oriented to the front, on the flanks, or around the security objective. The commander uses width and depth to maximize early warning and provide the BCT with the greatest amount of reaction time and maneuver space. Proper force array enables the commander to observe, disrupt, neutralize, and/or destroy an enemy force before reaching the security objective.

Indicators of Success

- The platoon leader provides a coherent FRAGORD with clear instructions.
- Security guidance is disseminated: focus, tempo, engagement criteria/ disengagement criteria.
- Subordinate elements are arrayed forward of PL CINDY to observe NAIs 2030 and 2035, and TAIs 3000 and 3005.
- The platoon leader plans mounted and dismounted observation posts (OPs) to create depth. He delineates long- or short-duration OPs and develops a plan to sustain them.
- OPs are provided cover and concealment and have observation of their assigned area.

- The platoon leader screens to provide early warning of the enemy for the BCT.
- The platoon leader does not violate rules of engagement (ROE).
- The platoon leader coordinates with adjacent units to maintain visual contact with the enemy.

Indicators of Failure

- The platoon leader does not array forces to protect his security objective.
- The platoon leader does not plan mounted and dismounted OPs and does not create depth.
- OPs are not provided cover and concealment or cannot observe their assigned NAI or TAI.
- The platoon leader fails to maintain screen, and changes the mission to civilian protection or detainee operations.
- The platoon leader does not coordinate with adjacent units to maintain visual contact with the enemy.
- The platoon leader fails to report rapidly and accurately.

Vignette 11. Perform Continuous Reconnaissance

You are a scout platoon leader and your troop is conducting a screen to disrupt enemy elements east of phase line (PL) IRON. Your platoon is currently occupied in a screen in the vicinity of PL IRON. The brigade combat team (BCT) is establishing a hasty defense 10 kilometers west of PL IRON and requires time to complete its defenses. The troop must provide observation forward of the BCT until battle positions are prepared and occupied to provide reaction time and maneuver space for the BCT. You must observe named areas of interest (NAIs) 1020 and 1030 to identify enemy forces and determine likely enemy avenues of approach. You must also destroy enemy reconnaissance elements to disrupt a potential attack.

The enemy has established dismounted observation posts (OPs) west of PL STEEL to disrupt friendly security efforts with indirect fire. A mounted reconnaissance element is conducting a zone reconnaissance along avenue of approach (AoA) JUPITER to identify a suitable route for an enemy deliberate attack. There are two to three dismounted OPs established in the area of operations (AO) with one platoon of armored reconnaissance moving along AoA JUPITER. Two enemy tank companies are expected to follow the reconnaissance element to conduct a deliberate attack in the next 24 hours. There are platoon-sized mobility corridors running north to south along PL GRANITE that the enemy may utilize to infiltrate your AO. Additionally, there is one enemy helicopter operating west of PL TITANIUM.

It is important that you destroy the enemy reconnaissance element and identify any potential attack routes. You possess the troop's Raven unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). You are first in priority for troop mortars and have two targets for planning. You have 10 minutes to develop your fragmentary order (FRAGORD).

Act now!




Figure A-11. Perform continuous reconnaissance

What Does “Perform Continuous Reconnaissance” Mean?

“Squadrons and maneuver battalions continuously seek the enemy and reconnoiter key terrain. Through continuous reconnaissance, forces continue to gain and maintain enemy contact, develop the situation, report rapidly and accurately, and retain freedom of maneuver to provide early and accurate warning, and provide reaction time and maneuver space to the protected force. Thus, the fundamentals of reconnaissance are implicit in all security operations. Commanders use the same reconnaissance methods, management, and techniques.”

— **Field Manual 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations, 01 JUL 2015**

“Security comes from detailed knowledge about the enemy and terrain within the assigned AO. This comes from ongoing reconnaissance that supports the overall unit surveillance and reconnaissance plan. As it attempts to determine enemy courses of action (COAs) by focusing on the enemy and key terrain, the platoon uses combinations of OPs, Army aviation, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), patrols, and other intelligence collection assets to perform continuous reconnaissance.”

— **Army Techniques Publication 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon, 05 APR 2013**

The commander employs all assets available to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance and never ceases collecting information about an enemy or the terrain. He continuously strives to gain better understanding of the AO to improve decision making within the BCT.

Operating environments are constantly changing. The enemy and terrain will continuously present new threats, obstacles, and challenges to the brigade. Reconnaissance elements must actively seek information to improve situational awareness, update assumptions, and create a complete picture for the brigade.

Indicators of Success

- The platoon leader conducts intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) to identify mobility corridors, refine NAIs, and template the potential enemy.
- The platoon leader provides security guidance to his platoon.
- The platoon leader plans mounted and dismounted OPs to maximize effectiveness of their screen.
- OPs are provided cover and concealment while maintaining good observation of their assigned NAI.
- The platoon leader incorporates all information collection assets available to observe their assigned zone.
- The platoon leader provides a task and purpose for each platform and incorporates redundancy, mixing, and cueing in his observation plan.
- The platoon leader continuously collects information about the enemy and terrain and disseminates it to higher headquarters.

Indicators of Failure

- The platoon leader fails to conduct IPB.
- The platoon leader fails to provide security guidance to his platoon.
- The platoon leader fails to assign primary and alternate observers for each NAI, does not disseminate priority information requirements or indicators for each NAI, and does not assign times to observe each NAI.
- The platoon leader fails to allocate assets through all phases of the operation.
- The platoon leader fails to assign a task and purpose to each information collection platform.
- The platoon leader fails to coordinate with adjacent units to cover dead space that cannot be observed by the platoon.
- The platoon leader fails to report information about the terrain and enemy to higher headquarters, and fails to update information as it becomes available.

Vignette 12. Maintain Enemy Contact

You are a scout platoon leader and you are part of a squadron guard along phase line (PL) BREWERS. Your troop has been ordered to occupy the western flank of the guard. Your platoon is the western platoon in your troop. You have been tasked to disrupt enemy forces along avenue of approach (AoA) RUTH in named area of interest (NAI) 1031 and target area of interest (TAI) 1033. The purpose of this operation is to allow the brigade combat team (BCT) to set conditions for the defense. Your key tasks are to locate enemy composition in NAI 1031 and TAI 1033, determine the AoA the enemy exploitation force is using to attack the BCT, conduct reconnaissance handover with the battalion scouts in the vicinity of checkpoint (CP) 1, and be the primary observer for indirect fire in TAI 1033.

The enemy has recently moved south from its defense and is expected to attack the BCT's defense south of PL BREWERS in 48 hours. The enemy has three templated courses of action (COAs) and one is the use of AoA RUTH. Within AoA RUTH, there is key terrain that will allow the enemy to set support by fire positions to allow the main body to pass. The enemy wants to gain a foothold in the pass in the vicinity of PL BREWERS to allow the exploitation force to breach the BCT's obstacles. The enemy's decisive point is seizing the high ground near NAI 1031. The enemy is supported by two 120mm mortars and engineers to reduce obstacles. The enemy support by fire is a platoon with six vehicle-mounted heavy machine guns and vehicle-mounted, anti-armor weapons.

An infantry battalion is defending to secure southeast of PL GIANTS to maintain decisive terrain that is vital for communications throughout the area of operations (AO). The infantry battalion has sent its scouts north to conduct a reconnaissance handover in the vicinity of CP 1. It is important that you identify the exploitation force so the BCT can confirm the enemy's timeline and prepare its defense. You are the squadron's main effort and have priority to direct the BCT's Shadow unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and the troop's Raven UAV. Your platoon is the priority of troop mortars and is tasked with providing two troop mortar targets. You have 10 minutes to develop your fragmentary order (FRAGORD).

Act now!




Figure A-12. Maintain enemy contact

What Does “Maintain Enemy Contact” Mean?

“Real-time and accurate information requires cavalry forces to gain and maintain contact with the enemy to rapidly report their actions and provide reaction time and maneuver space. Like the reconnaissance fundamental ‘gain and maintain enemy contact,’ maintaining enemy contact through one or more of the forms of contact enables the staff to make recommendations to the commander, generate options, identify opportunities, and seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.”

—Field Manual 3-98, *Reconnaissance and Security Operations*,
01 JUL 2015

Once the security force makes enemy contact, it does not break (unless the main force commander directs it) and continues to collect information on the enemy’s activities to assist the main body in determining potential enemy COAs.

The individual security asset that first makes contact does not have to maintain contact if the entire security force maintains contact with the enemy. The security force commander ensures that subordinates hand off contact with the enemy from one security asset to another. This compels the security force to have visual contact, use direct or indirect fires, and maneuver freely, which requires the security force to have depth in space and time.

Indicators of Success

- The platoon leader plans for long-duration observation posts (OPs) by mixing mounted and dismounted optics and an unmanned aircraft system (UAS) for depth, and focusing on priorities of work to maintain combat power.
- The platoon leader has an observation plan before, during, and after BCT operations.
- The platoon develops engagement areas and assigns weapons systems to enemy capabilities using echelon of fires.
- The platoon dedicates appropriate assets to each phase and gives each observation platform a task and purpose.
- The platoon leader uses higher echelon assets (i.e., Shadow UAV) to make enemy contact, and cues movement of additional observation assets.

- The platoon leader constantly reassesses his understanding of the situation and moves subordinate elements based on the enemy scheme of maneuver.
- The platoon leader uses assigned assets to cover any dead space and provides early warning.

Indicators of Failure

- The platoon leader does not prioritize weapons systems and priorities of work to maximize his combat power at the appropriate time.
- The platoon leader does not allocate appropriate assets to all phases of operations, and fails to provide additional assets when cued to do so.
- The platoon leader does not assign task and purpose of all organic units or attachments.
- The platoon leader does not coordinate with adjacent units to cover dead space that cannot be viewed by the platoon.
- OPs have platforms that do not allow observation of the entire objective or have not established subsequent or alternate battle positions to cover dead space.
- The platoon leader fails to use appropriate direct or indirect fires to disrupt the enemy's advance on the BCT.
- The platoon leader fails to hand over reconnaissance to the infantry defense to the rear.

Appendix B

Vignette Exercise Materials

Exercise Controller Instructions

Vignette 1. Ensure Continuous Reconnaissance

- Phase line (PL) CHIEFS: Engage the platoon with cannon-delivered indirect fire from the north at PL CHIEFS at the line of departure (LD) by using a placard against one of the sections. This contact should cause the platoon leader to quickly assess his ordered scheme of reconnaissance to account for probable enemy observers in visual range, directing artillery.
 - The platoon leader should continue the mission or issue a fragmentary order (FRAGORD) to address the new information, if necessary. As scout sections maneuver in zone, reveal the enemy observation post (OP) in the vicinity of targeted area of interest (TAI) 5050 to the section able to make visual contact (place a placard in or around named area of interest [NAI] 5050).
 - The platoon leader must assess the OP/listening post (LP) as an inferior force and maneuver the platoon to destroy the outpost with multiple forms of contact. If the platoon leader chooses a sound form of maneuver (i.e., envelopment with sections not in contact) and employs multiple forms of contact, the enemy is destroyed (turn over placard). If there is hesitation to act or no purposeful maneuver, the enemy breaks contact (remove placard). Redo this scenario at PL RAIDERS.
 - Once the contact with the OP/LP is resolved, the platoon should continue its reconnaissance immediately.
- PL RAMS: The platoon crosses PL RAMS and the enemy dismount team engages a scout section with an antitank guided missile (ATGM) and destroys one vehicle. The enemy ambush is not identified by the remaining vehicles.

- Cavalry leadership dilemma: The platoon leader now must quickly assess the ATGM ambush and its threat to the platoon and the mission. The platoon leader must decide on either spending precious time regaining contact with the enemy ambushing forces or moving forward into zone to orient on the reconnaissance objective. These competing demands are complicated by possible casualty evacuation and other factors. However, the platoon leader must pursue continuous reconnaissance.
- If he assesses that the ambush is a like or superior force, he may direct suppressive and indirect fires against the suspected enemy locations. He may also request smoke to screen his bypass and advance further into zone. He may request that the troop deploy its unmanned aircraft system (UAS) to surveil the suspected enemy locations. This action indicates the platoon leader is willing to accept some risk to the unit by bypassing an enemy ambush to accomplish his mission.
- If he assesses that the ambush is another inferior force, he may also maneuver to gain local superiority to destroy the threat with a sound form of maneuver and multiple forms of contact. This action indicates that the platoon leader is willing to accept some risk to the mission as he works to preserve his combat power.
- Once the contact with the ambush is resolved, the platoon should immediately continue its reconnaissance.
- PL RAIDERS: The platoon establishes observation of main supply route (MSR) BUD from multiple vantage points to find the enemy exploitation force moving south along MSR BUD. The platoon leader may conduct route reconnaissance of MSR BUD, if it is in his FRAGORD.
 - The platoon leader synchronizes observation plans of scout mounted and dismounted OPs. He reports dead space and his procedures for conducting reconnaissance handover between scout sections.
 - Once established, his platoon has negative contact with the suspected enemy exploitation force. The enemy does not use avenue of approach (AoA) DODGE, but takes an alternate route to the brigade combat team's (BCT's) defense.

- The troop commander reports that the squadron S-2 assessed the exploitation force advanced along avenue of approach (AoA) CHEVROLET north of PL JETS. The enemy had success along AoA CHEVROLET, but was stopped at the BCT main defensive area north. The squadron has negative contact with any enemy reserve formation.
- The enemy exploitation force bypassed the scout platoon's reconnaissance, but failed to breach the BCT's defenses. Assess the platoon leader as he develops negative contact. No contact with the expected enemy creates uncertainty and a common leadership dilemma.
- Cavalry leadership dilemma: The platoon leader now must quickly assess his situation. The platoon leader knows his templated enemy used another route into the BCT defense. He also knows the enemy committed at least one OP/LP supported with tube artillery and at least one anti-armor ambush to AoA DODGE, indicating the enemy values this route. He must decide on either continuing his mission along MSR BUD or repositioning closer to PL JETS to support the BCT defense. He may assess an opportunity to exploit repulsed enemy formations near PL JETS. These competing demands are complicated by the troop commander's report that the squadron has not gained contact with the unplanned enemy reserve formation. However, the platoon leader must pursue continuous reconnaissance.
- Allow the platoon leader to issue a FRAGORD and conduct any maneuver required in the order.
- Un-templated reserve: Reveal four tanks, eight Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty (BMP) infantry fighting vehicles moving south along MSR BUD from the release point toward the start point to the first scout section capable of making visual contact by placing the appropriate placards. Steadily move the enemy formation along MSR BUD toward and through PL CHIEFS.
- The platoon leader must direct reconnaissance handover between scout sections.
- The platoon leader must fight and report simultaneously.
- The platoon leader disrupts within his capability.
- The platoon leader issues a complete report to his higher headquarters, ensuring the BCT is not surprised by this unexpected enemy armor formation. (The BCT has time to address this threat.)

- If the scout platoon is moving away or is out of position, the platoon leader cannot provide the requisite information to his BCT commander. This demonstrates that he focused on his task more than accomplishing his purpose of preventing the enemy from surprising the BCT before, during, and after its defensive operations. This indicates failure by the platoon leader to demonstrate mastery of the fundamental conduct of continuous reconnaissance.




Figure B-1. Ensure continuous reconnaissance

Vignette 2. Do Not Keep Reconnaissance Assets in Reserve

- Prior to crossing phase line (PL) BULLS: The platoon receives indirect fire on attachments not given a task or purpose by the platoon leader. Place an indirect fire placard on these attachments and inform the platoon leader that due to the lack of guidance received, they were vulnerable and spotted by an enemy observation post (OP).
 - The platoon leader should identify any other asset or attachment not assigned a task and purpose. If he does not assign task and purpose to all elements, continue to destroy his attachments with indirect fire.
 - If the platoon leader assigns a task and purpose to all assets and attachments, then he does not come into any contact as he begins his maneuver.
- PL BULLS: The platoon leader does not receive any enemy contact. Allow the platoon leader to emplace his sections without enemy contact. Once set, evaluate how he maneuvered and established his sections and attachments.
 - If the platoon leader properly emplaced the prophet teams to directionally find the enemy, then reveal a company-sized battle position in named area of interest (NAI) 3032. Place an enemy company-sized battle position placard in NAI 3032 as well as six tanks and three Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty (BMP) infantry fighting vehicles. The platoon leader can continue to develop the situation with his other enablers; he can maneuver to engage with direct fire or engage with indirect fire.
 - * If the platoon leader maneuvers on the enemy armor, then destroy half of the platoon.
 - * If the platoon leader engages with indirect fire, then remove the enemy vehicle placards and inform the platoon leader that the tanks and BMPs moved to their hide site.
 - If the platoon leader flies the Raven over NAI 3030, then reveal an enemy OP consisting of enemy dismounts and one Boyevaya Razvedyvatel'naya Dozornaya Meshina (BRDM) combat reconnaissance patrol vehicle. Place placards in the vicinity of NAI 3030.
 - * If the platoon leader engages with indirect fire, then destroy the OP and turn the placard over.

- If the platoon leader properly uses the engineer reconnaissance team and they are in a position to observe NAI 3032, then place an obstacle placard on the map. The platoon has identified the enemy's obstacle belt. Write on the placard the type of obstacle, grid coordinates, dimensions, orientation, and composition. This will allow the platoon leader to generate a Blue 9 Obstacle Report (see Army Techniques Publication [ATP] 3-20.98, *Reconnaissance Platoon*, 05 APR 2013).
- If the platoon leader fails to employ these enablers, then he will not identify the enemy battle positions or obstacles.
- PL BUCKS: If the platoon leader fails to employ his enablers prior to crossing PL BUCKS, then place four tank and two BMP placards in NAI 3032 and destroy half the platoon receiving direct fire from enemy armor. If the platoon leader displaces, then remove the enemy armor placards showing that the platoon leader broke contact.
 - If the platoon leader remains decisively engaged and attempts to engage with direct fire and not displace, then destroy those remaining in the platoon; the platoon leader fails to achieve his reconnaissance objective.




Figure B-2. Do not keep reconnaissance assets in reserve

Vignette 3. Orient on the Reconnaissance Objective

- Phase line (PL) HOUSTON: The platoon comes into contact with a section of Boyevaya Razvedyvatelnaya Dozornaya Mashina (BRDM) combat reconnaissance patrol vehicles in named area of interest (NAI) 1045. Place a placard in the NAI to show the platoon leader he has observation of two BRDMs. The platoon leader now has to react to the contact.
 - Cavalry leadership dilemma: The platoon leader must assess that this observation post (OP)/listening post (LP) is an inferior force and maneuvers the platoon to destroy the outpost with multiple forms of contact. If the platoon leader chooses a sound form of maneuver (i.e., envelopment with sections not in contact) and employs multiple forms of contact, then the enemy is destroyed (turn over placard). If there is hesitation to act or no purposeful maneuver, then the enemy breaks contact (remove placard).
 - Once the contact with the OP/LP is resolved, the platoon should continue its reconnaissance immediately.
- PL LAS VEGAS: If the platoon leader did not destroy the BRDMs, then, as the platoon crosses PL LAS VEGAS, the platoon receives indirect fire from the BRDMs that were displaced. Place an indirect fire placard on one of the platoon leader vehicles. The vehicle is destroyed. The platoon leader still does not have observation of the BRDMs.
 - The vehicle that was destroyed by indirect fire is a catastrophic kill and there are no casualties to evacuate.
 - If the platoon leader destroyed the BRDMs at PL HOUSTON, then the platoon leader will not come into contact as he crosses PL LAS VEGAS.
- PL LOS ANGELES: The platoon leader can observe NAI 1070 and does not come into contact with any enemy.
 - The platoon leader now should develop the situation and understand that he has confirmed there is no enemy east of PL MIAMI (limit of advance [LOA]). He needs to recommend to continue his zone reconnaissance past PL MIAMI to achieve his reconnaissance objective and identify the enemy obstacles.
 - If the platoon leader fails to orient on the reconnaissance objective and to recommend continuing his zone reconnaissance, then stop the platoon leader and inform him of the following consequence: The troop failed to identify the enemy's defensive positions.

Following conduct of forward passage of lines (FPOL) with the troop in the vicinity of PL LOS ANGLES, the brigade combat team (BCT) decisive operation attacked into the engagement area of the enemy's southern-most mechanized infantry battalion. Not understanding where the enemy obstacles or battle positions were, the friendly maneuver battalion's support-by-fire position and suppressing of indirect fires were ill-positioned and ineffective at preventing the massing of enemy fires against the breach effort. The friendly breaching operation was destroyed without achieving a point of penetration, resulting in the failure of the BCT's attack.

- PL MIAMI: If the platoon leader recommends to continue his zone reconnaissance past PL MIAMI, then grant him permission. As the platoon leader crosses PL MIAMI, he identifies a platoon of Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty (BMP) infantry fighting vehicles in a battle position 3 kilometers west of NAI 1070. Place a placard 3 kilometers west of NAI 1070 of a platoon-sized battle position and three BMPs.
 - Cavalry leadership dilemma: The platoon leader must understand that he has located the enemy battle positions. He has identified the enemy; it is likely the enemy has not identified him because he is not being engaged. He now can decide to engage the enemy with direct fires, indirect fires, or maneuver his sections to gain better observation to identify the obstacles.
 - If the platoon leader maneuvers into the engagement area to attempt to engage with direct fires, then place a company battle position placard south of the BMPs and place six tank placards showing he just maneuvered into an enemy tank company engagement area. Destroy half the platoon.
 - If the platoon leader calls for indirect fire on the enemy, then remove the BMP placards as they move into a hide site until the enemy scouts can identify and destroy the platoon.
 - If the platoon leader uses the terrain well and attempts to gain multiple vantage points on the enemy battle position and surrounding area attempting to identify the obstacles, then place an obstacle placard southwest of NAI 1070. Write on the placard the type of obstacle, grid coordinates, dimensions, orientation, and composition. This will allow the platoon leader to generate a Blue 9 Obstacle Report. The vignette ends with the platoon leader accomplishing his mission.




Figure B-3. Orient on the reconnaissance objective

Vignette 4. Report All Information Rapidly and Accurately

- Phase line (PL) AVALANCHE: As the platoon crosses PL AVALANCHE, display an enemy dismounted observation post (OP) with an antitank weapon in named area of interest (NAI) 2005. Destroy one of the platoon's vehicles from the dismounted antitank engagement. The platoon leader now has to react to the contact.
 - Cavalry leadership dilemma: The platoon leader must assess that the OP/listening post (LP) is an inferior force and maneuvers the platoon to destroy the outpost with multiple forms of contact. If the platoon leader chooses a sound form of maneuver (i.e., envelopment with sections not in contact) and employs multiple forms of contact, then the enemy is destroyed (turn over placard). If there is hesitation to act or no purposeful maneuver, then the enemy breaks contact (remove placard).
 - Once the contact with the OP/LP is resolved, the platoon should continue its reconnaissance immediately.
- PL BRUINS: The platoon receives cannon-delivered indirect fire (place indirect fire placard on a section). Do not reveal where the enemy observer location is to the platoon leader. The indirect fire does not destroy the vehicle, but will cause the platoon leader to react.
 - The platoon leader must assess his location. He can continue to maneuver and attempt to locate the enemy OP. He can request an unmanned aerial system (UAS), rotary- or fixed-wing aviation support, or keep forces in position. Based on his actions, the following will happen:
 - * If he continues to maneuver west to locate the enemy, then, once he maneuvers within observation range of PL CANADIANS, displace a dismounted OP by placing a placard in the vicinity of PL CANADIANS within observation range of the platoon. If the platoon leader engages with indirect fire or a sound form of maneuver, then destroy the enemy OP by turning the placard over. If the platoon leader becomes fixed or does not use a sound form of maneuver (i.e., frontal attack), then display a dismounted antitank weapon system with the dismounts by placing a placard. Destroy one of the platoon's vehicles. Continue to destroy one vehicle each time the platoon leader makes a tactically unsound decision. If the platoon leader breaks contact, then remove the OP placard. Continue this if the platoon comes into direct fire range until the enemy threat is destroyed.

- * If the platoon leader requests a UAS or another asset, display the OP placard in the vicinity of PL CANADIANS. Inform the platoon leader that a UAS has spotted a three-man dismounted OP.
- * If the platoon leader remains in position, then the platoon receives another volley of indirect fire (place another indirect fire placard and destroy the OP). The platoon leader just had his section destroyed by indirect fire and should begin maneuvering and rapidly developing the situation.
- PL CANADIANS: As the platoon crosses PL CANADIANS, it identifies an enemy obstacle east of the release point.
 - If the platoon leader uses the terrain well and attempts to gain multiple vantage points once he identifies the obstacle, then write on the placard the type of obstacle, grid coordinates, dimensions, orientation, and composition. This will allow the platoon leader to generate a Blue 9 Obstacle Report.
 - The platoon leader should then try to locate a bypass and generate a Blue 10 Bypass Report.
 - If the platoon leader becomes fixed by the obstacle, then do not provide him any information about the obstacle. Inform the platoon leader that based on his location, he does not have good observation of the obstacle. This should prompt him to adjust his location to gain better observation. As the platoon leader gains better observation, write on the placard the type of obstacle, grid coordinates, dimensions, orientation, and composition. This will allow the platoon leader to generate a Blue 9 Obstacle Report.




Figure B-4a. Obstacles in the pass

- Advanced platoon leaders will understand that knowing the depth of 140 meters is important information because it will allow the engineers to prepare an additional mine-clearing line charge (MICLIC). This will also allow the platoon leader to report rapidly and accurately.
 - The platoon leader then should try to locate a bypass and generate a Blue 10 Bypass Report.
 - Once the platoon reaches the release point, the platoon leader should identify that the pass is suitable for wheeled and tracked vehicles, there are no width or overhead clearance issues, and the ground can support a combined arms battalion (CAB) attack through the pass. This should generate a rapid and accurate report.
- Once the platoon leader has completed maneuvering and reporting, and as the platoon becomes stationary and in the vicinity of the release point, display three tanks and three Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty (BMP) infantry fighting vehicles, 5 kilometers west of the release point.
 - This will generate action by the platoon leader and a detailed accurate report. This is one more instance for the platoon leader to succeed. Report all information rapidly and accurately. Along with the report of enemy activity, he should understand the enemy is farther east than templated. An advanced platoon leader will put emphasis on the fact that a CAB is attacking through the pass and the enemy is at the western opening.




Figure B-4b. Report all information rapidly and accurately

Vignette 5. Retain Freedom of Maneuver

- Assess the platoon leader's planning. During planning, the platoon leader should work out where enemy disruption forces are going to fight. He should determine the location of key terrain and understand the enemy's desire to retain it. His order should deliver a deliberate scheme of maneuver against those locations. For example, he may assess a Boyevaya Razvedyuatel'naya Dozornaya Meshina (BRDM) combat reconnaissance patrol vehicle/dismounted observation post (OP) at NAI 1005. Later in his order, the platoon leader should address his maneuver plan when approaching named area of interest (NAI) 1005. It may be a hasty attack with two or three scout sections. This action indicates he recognizes the threat, wants to create overmatch (make contact on his own terms) for short periods, dominate the fight with multiple forms of contact, and deny the use of key terrain by the enemy scouts (i.e., fighting for positions of advantage, fighting for information for short periods). Setting conditions to gain local superiority for short periods indicates a firm grasp of cavalry maneuvers. Vee or line formations and only traveling his platoon into contact indicate failure to maneuver.
- Phase line (PL) BUDWEISER: The platoon line of departure (LD) has no contact with the enemy. The platoon leader assesses movement technique and formation. He could choose traveling or traveling overwatch as his movement technique. The platoon leader's intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) may reveal that PL BUDWEISER to PL COORS is an area where he can accept some risk because enemy contact is not likely. Predicting PL COORS as the probable line of contact indicates the platoon leader understands relationships among the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) mission variables. He may still choose bounding overwatch from the LD if he assesses that the disruption zone OPs will include long-range, antitank missiles. Having no consideration of the mission variables, however, demonstrates low competence in planning cavalry maneuvers.
- PL COORS: Engage the platoon with cannon-delivered indirect fire from the east at PL COORS (place a placard against one of the sections, but only with suppressive effects). These fires are observed by an enemy OP in NAI 1005, but it remains hidden out of visual contact. This contact should cause the platoon leader to quickly assess his ordered scheme of reconnaissance to account for probable enemy observers in visual range, directing the artillery. If the platoon leader did his situation template correctly, he should start confirming his assessment.

- NAI 1005: As scout sections maneuver in zone, reveal enemy mounted OP (BRDM) supported by a team of dismounted scouts in NAI 1005 to the section able to make visual contact by placing the placard.
- Cavalry leadership dilemma: The platoon leader must quickly assess if enemy scouts are applying multiple forms of contact against his platoon. The cannon fires complicate his understanding of the situation. The platoon leader must decide if his current scheme is sufficient to address whether the contact or a platoon battle drill (platoon hasty attack) must be initiated. Either way, applying two or three scout sections and multiple forms of contact against the enemy hasty positions indicates the platoon leader understands how to fight to establish local superiority for short periods while applying available enablers. This is the key to retaining freedom of maneuver.
- While massing against this inferior force, assess the risk the platoon leader is taking elsewhere in his zone. He should be able to describe the risk in a manner that demonstrates he understands accepting risk in the south, while addressing the threat in the north until he resolves the contact. In doing so, he can retain freedom of maneuver. Advanced understanding is demonstrated if the platoon leader applies his Raven unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or some small force (for example, one scout vehicle) on the southern flank of his hasty attack. This will protect the maneuver by providing early warning, if the platoon leader calculates he can spare the combat power from the hasty attack.
- The platoon leader must assess whether the BRDM/OP/ dismounted listening post (LP) is an inferior force to his platoon. He must then maneuver the platoon to destroy the outpost with multiple forms of contact.
- If the platoon leader chooses a sound form of maneuver (i.e., envelopment with sections not in contact) and employs multiple forms of contact against the BRDM and dismounts, the enemy is destroyed (turn over placards). Accurate and timely reporting should be delivered.
- If there is hesitation to act or no purposeful maneuver (the platoon leader plunges ahead in a frontal assault), the enemy BRDM breaks contact (remove placard) and the OP engages with indirect fire until out of visual range. Redo this scenario at NAI 1006.

- Once contact with the enemy screen is resolved, the platoon should immediately continue its reconnaissance to regain its positions across the platoon leader's zone, mitigating earlier risk. The platoon leader needs to demonstrate that his fight was short on purpose, and he can transition back to the fundamentals of reconnaissance after a quick, well-resourced and controlled offensive operation.
- The successful platoon leader transitioned seamlessly and made contact on his terms. The following skills are imperative to the cavalry leader: cognitive ability and agility to know when to use offense and defense, and knowing when to immediately transition back to reconnaissance. This preserves the freedom and gumption to maneuver and achieve purpose. When all scout platoon leaders become great at this task, it generates enormous capability for the squadron to move fast and exploit fleeting opportunities.
- Unsuccessful scout platoon leaders cannot lead transitions among reconnaissance and security, and offense, defense, and stability without being explicitly ordered to do so. This indicates a task-oriented leader who fails to consider the importance of his purpose. A squadron full of these platoon leaders is slow and usually out of position to exploit anything.
- NAI 1006: Repeat the above scenario with the enemy now revealed in NAI 1006. This engagement should be better than the first. Assess casualties as necessary. However, the key is retaining freedom of maneuver by gaining local superiority against the inferior enemy (another BRDM supported by a team of dismounts) in NAI 1006, maneuvering on purpose with effective form of maneuver (most likely envelopment), and accepting prudent risk elsewhere for short periods. Use multiple forms of contact and reporting.
- PL DOS EQUIS: After resolving contact at NAI 1006, the platoon again immediately redeploys across the width of the zone, resuming all fundamentals of reconnaissance. The northern scout section makes contact with an enemy bulldozer digging a tank ditch in NAI 1010 (reveal tank ditch and bulldozer placards). Engage the southern section with cannon-delivered indirect fire from the east by using an indirect fire placard, only with suppressive effects. These fires are observed by a dismounted OP in NAI 1008. The enemy is late with this tank ditch, still trying to dig in. The enemy's engineers are overwatched by another enemy scout section (BRDM with dismounts) in NAI 1008. Reveal the enemy in 1008 when a scout section is in visual range.

- Cavalry leadership dilemma: The platoon leader now has contact with an enemy obstacle and engineers. He also has contact with the enemy's security force. The platoon leader's scout sections are likely abreast. He likely has no clear local superiority to the security section. He is also in indirect fire contact. Assess his ability to understand, decide, direct, and lead his platoon through this scenario.
- The platoon leader must assess whether the BRDM/OP/LP is an inferior force to his entire platoon. However, he also must address templated enemy engineers and obstacles in NAI 1010. Advanced platoon leaders will recognize a fleeting opportunity may exist in NAI 1010. He might assess that destroying the enemy's ability to emplace the obstacle in NAI 1010 may give the brigade combat team (BCT) commander an unexpected advantage and achieve the platoon leader's purpose (create maneuver space for the decisive operation).
- The platoon leader may choose to address these problems sequentially. This indicates that he wants to ensure he applies enough combat power to attack to destroy the BRDM security section, then deal with the engineers later in time. If the platoon leader chooses a sound form of maneuver (i.e., envelopment with sections not in contact) and employs multiple forms of contact against the BRDM and dismounts, the enemy is destroyed (turn over placard). However, the engineers in NAI 1010 manage to break contact and escape farther east. This course of action (COA) indicates basic understanding of this fundamental of reconnaissance. This COA is easiest to control and addresses the perceived most dangerous threat first, reducing risk to his unit, thus retaining freedom of maneuver. Timely and accurate reporting should be delivered.

- The platoon leader may choose to address these problems simultaneously. He might maneuver a section or two against the BRDM section, while maintaining contact with the bulldozer with his remaining section. This indicates his platoon has enough combat power for both problems and the requisite higher mission command competency to handle contact across his entire front. If the platoon leader chooses a sound form of maneuver (i.e., envelopment of the BRDM section and frontal attack against the enemy bulldozer) and employs multiple forms of contact against both forces, the enemy is destroyed (turn over the BRDM and bulldozer). This COA, if purposefully executed (not just allowing two or three section sergeants to develop the situation on their own), is advanced and the most difficult to control. Reporting is likely more difficult with contact reports coming from across his formation simultaneously.
- Reveal the tank ditch obstacle placard in the lane to allow a Blue 9 Obstacle Report and Blue 10 Bypass Report.
- The platoon leader renders the Blue 9 Obstacle Report and Blue 10 Bypass Report in accordance with the unit standard operating procedure (SOP) or ATP 3-20.98.
- If there is hesitation to act or no purposeful maneuver (remaining on PL DOS EQUIS, gathering no information of value to the BCT) or the platoon is essentially fixed by the enemy contact across its front, the platoon has lost freedom of maneuver. This indicates failure by the platoon leader to demonstrate mastery of the fundamental of reconnaissance to retain freedom of maneuver.




Figure B-5. Retain freedom of maneuver

Vignette 6. Gain and Maintain Enemy Contact

- Phase line (PL) HOUSTON: Engage the platoon with cannon-delivered indirect fire from the west at PL HOUSTON at the line of departure (LD) (place a placard against one of the sections). These fires are observed by a dismounted observation post (OP) in named area of interest (NAI) 1040, but it remains hidden and out of visual contact. This contact should cause the platoon leader to quickly assess his ordered scheme of reconnaissance to account for probable enemy observers in visual range, directing the artillery.
 - As scout sections maneuver in zone, reveal the enemy mounted OPs/Boyevaya Razvedyvatel'naya Dozornaya Meshina (BRDM) combat reconnaissance patrol vehicles on the eastern edge of NAI 1045 to the section able to make visual contact by placing a placard.
 - Cavalry leadership dilemma: The platoon leader must quickly assess that enemy scouts are applying multiple forms of contact against his platoon. The cannon fires complicate his understanding of the situation. The platoon leader must decide how to maintain and resolve contact with the known BRDM, while maneuvering to gain contact with other suspected observers in his zone.
 - The platoon leader must assess the BRDM/OP/listening post (LP) as an inferior force and maneuver the platoon to destroy the outpost with multiple forms of contact. However, he also must address the templated enemy in NAI 1040.
 - The platoon leader may choose to address these problems sequentially. This indicates that he wants to ensure there is enough combat power to attack and destroy the BRDM (and potential unidentified wingmen), then deal with the possible OP in NAI 1040 later. If the platoon leader chooses a sound form of maneuver (i.e., envelopment with sections not in contact) and employs multiple forms of contact against the BRDM, the enemy is destroyed (turn over placard). However, the OP in NAI 1040 continues to engage the platoon with indirect fire until it maneuvers to find and kill the OP. This course of action (COA) indicates a basic understanding of the fundamentals of reconnaissance. This COA is easiest to control and addresses the perceived most dangerous threat first, reducing risk to his unit. Timely and accurate reporting should be delivered.

- The platoon leader may choose to address these problems simultaneously. He might maneuver a section or two against the BRDM, while hunting for the OP with his remaining section. This indicates he assesses that his platoon has enough combat power for both problems and the requisite higher mission command competency to handle contact across his entire front. If the platoon leader chooses a sound form of maneuver (i.e., envelopment with BRDM sections and area reconnaissance by the NAI 1040 section) and employs multiple forms of contact against both forces, the enemy is destroyed (turn over the BRDM and the dismounted OP placard in NAI 1040). This COA, if purposefully executed (not just allowing two or three section sergeants to develop the situation on their own), is advanced and the most difficult to control. Reporting is likely more difficult with contact reports coming from across his formation simultaneously.
- If there is hesitation to act or no purposeful maneuver (plunges ahead in frontal assault), the enemy BRDM breaks contact (remove placard) and the OP engages with indirect fire until out of visual range. Redo this scenario at PL INDIANAPOLIS.
- Once the contacts with the enemy screen are resolved, the platoon should continue its reconnaissance immediately to gain and maintain contact with enemy main body forces.
- PL INDIANAPOLIS: The platoon crosses PL INDIANAPOLIS, and the enemy dismount team engages a scout section with an antitank guided missile (ATGM) and damages one vehicle (mobility). The enemy ambush is identified by the damaged vehicle. Reveal the enemy ATGM placard in NAI 1065.
 - Cavalry leadership dilemma: The platoon leader now must quickly assess the ATGM ambush and its threat to the platoon and the mission. He must demonstrate that he understands he lost the initiative to the ambushing force. Is this the enemy main body? Was the enemy engagement area found? Where are the expected obstacles? The platoon leader must maintain his current contact to confirm or deny the situation template. These competing demands are complicated by possible casualty evacuation, vehicle recovery, and other factors. The platoon leader must regain the initiative.

- If the platoon leader assesses the ambush is a like or superior force, he may direct suppressive direct and indirect fire against enemy ATGM ambush (support by fire) with the degraded scout section in contact. He can then advance his other scout section(s) farther into zone (finding an assailable flank to assault). The platoon leader must realize that negative contact by his southern section(s) is important. He reports the ATGM is a small enemy force (likely still disruption forces). The platoon still has freedom of maneuver in zone based on no contact in the south.
- The platoon leader must realize and report he has not made contact with the main defensive area. The situation template might be wrong.
- The platoon leader may request that the troop deploy its Raven to surveil the enemy locations or ease the assault forces' maneuver. Indicating deeper thinking, the platoon leader may direct the Raven farther into zone to NAI 1070. This will add depth to his reconnaissance while he addresses his current contact with a hasty attack.
- These or similar actions indicate the platoon leader understands that he does not have the initiative and must wrest it from the enemy through action. It also indicates he can organize all his efforts, assets, and capabilities, while mitigating his limitations toward accomplishing the reconnaissance objective by seeking to gain and maintain enemy contact through the depth of his zone. He clearly understands how to establish advantageous conditions for maintaining enemy contact. He fights on his own terms, which he created on purpose.
- If the platoon leader chooses a sound form of maneuver (i.e., envelopment with sections not in contact) and employs multiple forms of contact against the ATGM ambush, the enemy is destroyed (turn over placard).
- If there is hesitation to act or no purposeful maneuver (awkward, frontal assault), the enemy ambush breaks contact (remove placard after firing more missiles and killing more scouts). The ambush accomplished its mission of gaining time for the defensive preparation. These non-actions indicate the platoon leader's failure to understand how to gain and maintain enemy contact on his own favorable terms. The enemy dictated these terms.

- Once the contact with the ambush is resolved, the platoon should continue its reconnaissance immediately. Where are the obstacles and other indicators of the defense?
- PL MIAMI: The platoon makes no further contact and reaches PL MIAMI. The platoon leader is likely establishing observation from PL MIAMI, but continues to have negative contact with the enemy main defensive area. Render the initial Blue 7 Route Reconnaissance Report in accordance with the unit standard operating procedure (SOP) or Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-20.98.
 - The platoon leader synchronizes the observation plans of scout-mounted and dismounted OPs. He reports dead space and procedures for conducting reconnaissance handover between scout sections. Once established, his platoons have negative contact with the suspected enemy defense.
 - The enemy is defending farther west than anticipated, but cannot observe west of the mountain mass along the northern and western boundaries. The enemy assess the platoon leader as he develops negative contact. No contact with the expected enemy creates uncertainty and a common leadership dilemma.
 - Cavalry leadership dilemma: Although his chosen or given tasks (i.e., zone, route, or area reconnaissance) appear complete, the platoon leader must realize he has not achieved the reconnaissance objective (find an axis of attack suitable for at least one maneuver battalion to reach the enemy defensive obstacles and conduct breaching operations). He has not gained or maintained contact with the enemy obstacles. This is where cavalry leaders must demonstrate disciplined initiative.
 - If the platoon leader reports clearly that he has not yet achieved the reconnaissance objective, he may recommend to the troop commander that he needs to maneuver a few hundred more meters west or north. This will allow the platoon leader to gain vantage points for observation west of the significant mountain masses in the northwest and southwest of his zone along his boundaries.

- The troop commander responds positively to proactive recommendations. His dialogue might include: “Permission granted. PL MIAMI was the limit of advance (LOA) based on indirect fire supporting range. The fire support officer is repositioning the mortars to support your movement. The troop mortars can range 500 meters west of PL MIAMI. I can also establish a hasty Raven-restricted operations zone west of PL MIAMI, or wherever you want it to extend your tactical reach. The platoon to your north is staying at PL MIAMI. Move when ready; the BCT commander is closely monitoring your reporting.”
- Allow the platoon leader to issue a fragmentary order (FRAGORD) and conduct any maneuver required in that order. If he puts scouts in a position to observe the maneuver corridor west of the mountain in the northwest (north of NAI 1070), reveal a wire-mine-wire obstacle placard in the lane. Provide the platoon leader with the type of obstacle, grid coordinates, dimensions, orientation, and composition.
- The platoon leader renders the Blue 9 Obstacle Report and Blue 10 Bypass Report in accordance with the unit SOP or ATP 3-20.98.
- If there is hesitation to act or no purposeful maneuver (remaining on PL MIAMI, gathering no information of value to the BCT), the platoon failed to accomplish the reconnaissance objective. This indicates failure by the platoon leader to demonstrate mastery of the fundamental of reconnaissance to gain and maintain enemy contact.




Figure B-6. Gain and maintain enemy contact

Vignette 7. Develop the Situation Rapidly

- Phase line (PL) BRAVES: As the platoon crosses PL BRAVES, place an antitank guided missile (ATGM) placard within 5 kilometers of the vehicle it destroys, southeast of named area of interest (NAI) 2020. The ATGM engages and destroys one vehicle from the platoon. It is a catastrophic kill and there are no casualties alive for evacuation. This contact should cause the platoon leader to quickly assess his ordered scheme of reconnaissance to account for the enemy antitank threat.
 - Cavalry leadership dilemma: The platoon leader now must quickly assess the ATGM ambush and its threat to the platoon and the mission. The platoon leader must decide whether to spend precious time regaining contact with the enemy ambushing forces or moving forward in zone to orient on the reconnaissance objective. The platoon leader must develop the situation rapidly.
 - If he assesses the ambush is a like or superior force, he may direct suppressive direct and indirect fire against suspected enemy locations and request smoke to screen his bypass and advance farther into zone. He may request that the troop deploy its unmanned aircraft system (UAS) to surveil the suspected enemy locations. This action indicates that the platoon leader is willing to accept some risk to the unit by bypassing an enemy ambush to accomplish his mission.
 - If he assesses that the ambush is an inferior force, he may also maneuver to gain local superiority to destroy the threat with a sound form of maneuver and multiple forms of contact. This action indicates the platoon leader is willing to accept some risk to his mission as he works to preserve his combat power.
 - Once the contact with the ambush is resolved, the platoon should continue its reconnaissance immediately.
- Established first observation post (OP): Once the platoon establishes its first OP, that OP receives cannon-delivered indirect fire. (Place indirect fire placard on the OP. Do not reveal the enemy observer location to the platoon leader. The indirect fire does not destroy the vehicle but will cause the platoon leader to react.)
 - The platoon leader must assess his OP location. He can continue to maneuver and attempt to locate the enemy OP, request a UAS or rotary- or fixed-wing aviation support, or keep his OP in position. Based on his actions, the following will happen:

- * If he continues to maneuver west to locate the enemy, then, once he maneuvers within observation range of NAI 2025, displace a dismounted OP by placing a placard in the NAI. If the platoon leader engages with indirect fire or a sound form of maneuver, then destroy the enemy OP by turning the placard over. If the platoon leader becomes fixed or does not use a sound form of maneuver (i.e., frontal attack), then display a dismounted antitank weapon system with the dismounts by placing a placard and destroy one of the platoon's vehicles. Continue to destroy one vehicle each time the platoon leader makes a tactically unsound decision. If the platoon leader breaks contact, then remove the OP placard. Continue this if the platoon comes into direct fire range until the enemy threat is destroyed.
- * If the platoon leader requests a UAS or another asset, then deny him. Explain that, due to the winds, nothing is flying. Make the platoon leader maneuver.
- * If the platoon leader has the OP remain in position, then the OP receives another volley of indirect fire. Place another indirect fire placard and destroy the OP. The platoon leader just had his OP destroyed by indirect fire and should begin maneuvering and developing the situation rapidly.
- PL CUBS: As the platoon approaches PL CUBS, reveal an obstacle in NAI 2025. Place the placard in NAI 2025, but do not give the platoon leader information about the obstacle until he maneuvers sections to gain multiple vantage points.
 - As the platoon leader maneuvers to gain multiple vantage points on the obstacle, write on the placard the obstacle type, grid coordinates, dimensions, orientation, and composition. This will allow the platoon leader to generate a Blue 9 Obstacle Report.
 - The platoon leader has now accomplished half his tasks. He should assess the situation and realize he needs to identify battle positions. A successful cavalry leader does not stop his reconnaissance; he develops the situation rapidly to allow the BCT to accomplish its mission.
 - If the platoon leader establishes OPs and fails to continue to maneuver to identify the enemy battle positions, then end the vignette and place three enemy company battle positions 2 kilometers west of the obstacle. Ask the platoon leader what his reconnaissance objective was. He should then realize that he did not identify the enemy battle positions and has learned a valuable lesson.

- If the platoon leader continues to maneuver to locate the enemy battle positions, then, once he has executed a sound form of maneuver and has positioned OPs on advantageous terrain, display the enemy battle positions by placing the three company battle positions 2 kilometers west of the obstacle. This should generate a detailed report from the platoon leader and he has accomplished his mission.




Figure B-7. Develop the situation rapidly

Vignette 8. Provide Early and Accurate Warning

- Phase line (PL) CHICAGO: Engage the platoon with cannon-delivered indirect fire from the northeast as the platoon crosses PL CHICAGO (place a placard against one of the sections). This contact should cause the platoon leader to quickly assess his ordered scheme of reconnaissance to account for probable enemy observers in visual range, directing the artillery.
 - He should continue the mission or issue a fragmentary order (FRAGORD) to address new information, if necessary. As scout sections maneuver in zone, reveal the enemy observation post (OP) in the vicinity of named area of interest (NAI) 2005 to the section able to make visual contact (place a placard in and around NAI 2005).
 - Cavalry leadership dilemma: The platoon leader must assess that the OP/listening post (LP) is an inferior force and maneuver the platoon to destroy the outpost with multiple forms of contact. If the platoon leader chooses a sound form of maneuver (i.e., envelopment with sections not in contact) and employs multiple forms of contact, the enemy is destroyed (turn over placard). If there is hesitation to act or no purposeful maneuver, the enemy breaks contact (remove placard). Redo this scenario at PL DALLAS, if the platoon leader fails to destroy the enemy and loses contact.
 - Once the contact with the OP/LP is resolved, the platoon should continue its reconnaissance immediately.
- PL DALLAS: The platoon leader should establish OPs in the vicinity of PL DALLAS and PL CHICAGO to establish observation east and in depth. After the platoon is set, the platoon leader reports to the troop what he can observe and that he has no contact with the enemy.
 - Once the platoon is established, show a placard of eight Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty (BMP) infantry fighting vehicles and eight Boyevaya Razvedyuyatel'naya Dozornaya Meshina (BRDM) combat reconnaissance patrol vehicles in NAI 2010, confirming the enemy is using avenue of approach (AoA) SEGA. If the platoon leader is utilizing the troop's Raven UAV, then show the enemy farther east of AoA SEGA and tell him he observed the enemy using the Raven 10 minutes prior than he would have with his own observation. This will key the platoon leader to the fact that he now has to delay the enemy for only 50 more minutes to be successful.

- The platoon leader has the opportunity to provide early and accurate warning to the brigade combat team (BCT). His reports should clearly articulate that he has not identified breaching assets or tanks.
- The platoon leader can attempt to engage with direct or indirect fire to delay the attacking enemy. This will provide more reaction time and maneuver space. If he has failed to emplace Modular Pack Mine Systems (MOPMS) or cratering charges prior to observation of the enemy and attempts to engage, then they will be mildly effective and only delay the enemy 10 minutes total. If he planned where to emplace the cratering charges and MOPMS prior to observation of the enemy, then they are more effective and will delay the enemy 25 minutes.
- If the platoon leader employs the jamming asset, then delay the enemy 10 minutes due to the jamming.
- If the platoon leader has emplaced dismounted antitank positions with Javelins or AT-4s in depth, then he will delay the enemy 10 minutes at PL DALLAS and 10 minutes at PL CHICAGO.
- If the platoon leader plans and integrates the troop mortars, then he will delay the enemy five minutes with each mortar mission he calls on the enemy, provided he has calculated a trigger based on the enemy's rate of march.
- The platoon leader has enough assets to delay the enemy 85 minutes. He only has to delay the enemy 60 minutes. Therefore, there is ample room for success.
- Move the enemy placards south of PL BOSTON. The platoon leader should have passed the targets back and continued to observe NAI 2010 as more of the enemy is templated to follow.
- After the fixing force is south of PL BOSTON, show an enemy placard in NAI 2010 with six tanks, eight BMPs, and two bulldozers. This should generate a detailed report from the platoon leader as he has identified the assault force and the enemy's breaching assets. The platoon leader should have exhausted all demolition and only have troop mortars and his direct fire to engage the enemy, if he chooses.
- The platoon leader issues a complete report to his higher headquarters, ensuring the BCT is not surprised by this unexpected enemy armor formation. The BCT has time to address this threat.




Figure B-8. Provide early and accurate warning

Vignette 9. Provide Reaction Time and Maneuver Space

- The platoon is arrayed along phase line (PL) INDIANAPOLIS, screening west; it has limited observation of named areas of interest (NAIs) 3005, 3010, 3015, and 3020. The troop commander informs the platoon leader that the squadron S-2 estimates the enemy fixing force will be identified by a division asset east of the area of operations (AO) in the next 12 to 24 hours. The fixing force consists of at least four tanks and nine Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty (BMP) infantry fighting vehicles. The report should initiate internal communication and that the platoon maneuver plan may change.
- The platoon leader must decide whether to adjust the observation plan based on his ability to observe the NAIs within his AO. He may choose to remain arrayed along PL INDIANAPOLIS or may execute a movement to contact, zone reconnaissance, or infiltration to establish subsequent screens in the vicinity of PL LAS VEGAS or PL MIAMI. Provide the platoon leader the injects below based on his decision on where to establish his screen.
- PL INDIANAPOLIS: Vehicles and personnel of a quartering party for the brigade combat team (BCT) tactical command post occupy a position in a draw west of PL INDIANAPOLIS. The BCT's S-3 linked up with one of the scouts and told him the BCT decisive operation intends to emplace battle positions on the hill mass occupied by his section. Further, the battalion's engagement area will extend approximately 3 kilometers east of PL INDIANAPOLIS.
 - If the platoon leader decides to adjust his observation plan by positioning farther east, continue to the next inject.
 - If the platoon leader decides to maintain his position along PL INDIANAPOLIS, inform him that the BCT decisive operation will conduct engagement area development (place a friendly battle position placard). The squadron S-2 reports that a division asset identified a battalion-sized element moving rapidly west into the BCT AO. Place a placard of the enemy fixing force, consisting of five tanks and 12 BMPs in NAI 3025. Continue to move the placard west to establish a support-by-fire position northwest of NAI 3025. Once the friendly and enemy placards are within 3 kilometers of one another, place the placard depicting the enemy assault force in NAI 3025 and continue to move west. Place a smoke placard indicating obscuration fires in the vicinity of PL INDIANAPOLIS. Place the placard of the enemy exploitation force in NAI 3035 and move west into position to exploit a breach conducted by an assault force.

- Indicate successful breach and/or penetration of friendly defensive positions:
 - * The platoon leader should not receive effects with indirect fire; there is insufficient battle space to allow for the development of tactical and technical triggers for fires against a rapidly maneuvering enemy force.
 - * Family of scatterable mines (FASCAM) should fail to separate enemy echelons.
 - * Place a placard to indicate commitment of the BCT reserve to reinforce the BCT decisive operation that was committed too late; the enemy exploitation force engages and destroys the reserve in open terrain in a movement to contact.
- PL LAS VEGAS: Note whether the platoon leader has arrayed his OPs to allow for depth in his screen, and provide the appropriate inject.
 - Depth: The platoon should have observation of NAIs 3005, 3010, 3015, and 3025, and limited observation of NAI 3030.
 - * The platoon leader should receive effects with indirect fire between PL INDIANAPOLIS and PL LAS VEGAS, provided he has indicated the planning of tactical and technical triggers for fires against a rapidly maneuvering enemy force. East of PL LAS VEGAS, indirect fire has limited effect due to lack of observation.
 - * FASCAM separates enemy echelons, provided the platoon leader has indicated the planning of tactical and technical triggers for fires against a rapidly maneuvering enemy force.
 - * Place a placard to indicate commitment of the BCT reserve to reinforce the BCT decisive operation. If committed too late, the enemy exploitation force engages and destroys the reserve in open terrain in a movement to contact.
 - Lack of depth: The platoon should have observation of NAIs 3005, 3010, 3015, and 3025, and limited observation of NAI 3030.
- PL MIAMI: Note whether the platoon leader has arrayed his OPs to allow for depth in his screen and provide the appropriate inject.
 - Depth: The platoon should have good observation of NAIs 3005, 3010, 3015, 3025, 3030, and 3035.

- * The platoon leader should receive effects with indirect fire, provided he has indicated the planning of tactical and technical triggers for fires against a rapidly maneuvering enemy force.
- * FASCAM separates enemy echelons, provided the platoon leader has indicated the planning of tactical and technical triggers for fires against a rapidly maneuvering enemy force.
- * Place a placard to indicate commitment of the BCT reserve to reinforce the BCT decisive operation. Committed in a timely manner, the BCT reserve occupies battle positions and contributes to the destruction of the enemy fixing and assault forces.

- Lack of depth: The platoon should have observation of NAI 3030, and limited observation of NAI 3005, 3010, 3015, and 3025.
 - * The platoon leader should receive effects with indirect fire against a target east of PL LAS VEGAS, provided he has indicated the planning of tactical and technical triggers for fires against a rapidly maneuvering enemy force. Once west of PL LAS VEGAS, the platoon is unable to effect the enemy through the employment of fires due to lack of observation.
 - * FASCAM separates enemy echelons, provided the platoon leader has indicated the planning of tactical and technical triggers for fires against a rapidly maneuvering enemy force.
 - * Place a placard to indicate commitment of the BCT reserve to reinforce. Committed in a timely manner, the BCT reserve occupies battle positions and contributes to the destruction of the enemy fixing and assault forces.




Figure B-9. Provide reaction time and maneuver space

Vignette 10. Orient on the Protected Force, Area, or Facility

- Platoon lines of departure (LDs) from PL CINDY are to occupy a screen in the vicinity of PL BILL (limit of advance [LOA]). At the LD, the platoon leader is given intelligence that an enemy force has been identified west of the area of operations (AO), traveling east at a high rate of speed. Enemy composition is reported to be three to four Boyevaya Razvedyvatel'naya Dozornaya Meshina (BRDM) combat reconnaissance patrol vehicles and four tanks.
 - The report should invoke concern and the platoon leader should reassess his maneuver plan.
 - The platoon leader should disseminate the information to the platoon. If the platoon leader requests additional information, inform the platoon leader that the unmanned aircraft system (UAS) is off station at this time.
 - Direct and indirect fire planning and coordination should adjust to ensure adequate surface danger zones.
- PL BILL: As the platoon is setting in the screen, a civilian vehicle is identified in the vicinity of named area of interest (NAI) 2035. The civilian vehicle appears non-hostile, but is moving semi-erratically (display placard). Inform the platoon leader that you have observed civilians dismounting the vehicle. They appear to be having a discussion and may be lost. You now observe the civilians reentering the vehicle, resuming travel east, toward the platoon.
 - Cavalry leadership dilemma: The platoon leader must assess the situation and determine if the civilians are a threat. The platoon leader may engage the vehicle (turn placard over), interdict it, or allow the civilians to pass freely through the screen (move placard to PL CINDY and remove). If the platoon interdicts the vehicle, the platoon leader must determine how much time to allocate toward the civilians and other associated actions.
 - The platoon leader cannot violate rules of engagement (ROE), but may interdict the vehicle. The platoon leader must avoid changing the mission to civilian protection or detainee operations. He must establish a screen to provide early warning for the brigade combat team (BCT). He should not warn the civilians of friendly battle positions. This would violate essential elements of friendly information and operations security.

- If the platoon leader temporarily detains the civilians, then the platoon must provide sustainment and security to the civilians.
- He should report the contact to his higher headquarters and must adhere to rules of engagement (ROE).
- NAI 2035: The enemy force is identified moving east along AoA HOUSTON. The platoon identifies an armored reconnaissance element with one tank company moving behind them (display placards).
 - The platoon leader collects information on enemy composition and disposition and reports.
 - The platoon engages the enemy in accordance with its engagement criteria. The enemy reconnaissance element returns fire, but is disrupted (turn placard over).
 - Upon disrupting the enemy reconnaissance element, the first tank company enters NAI 2035 and engages the platoon. The platoon loses 25 percent combat power (turn placards over). The second tank company then appears west of NAI 2035 (display placard) and is observed changing direction north toward PL AMANDA (remove placard as it crosses PL AMANDA).
 - Cavalry leadership dilemma: The platoon leader must assess the situation and determine when to disengage the enemy. The platoon should not displace but remain in covered and concealed positions to observe the enemy as it travels east and north. The platoon should allow the first tank companies to pass through the screen and report. The platoon should conduct a reconnaissance handover with its adjacent platoon to maintain observation on the second tank company. The desire to engage the enemy may overwhelm the platoon leader, but this will result in the platoon losing excessive combat power. In doing so, they will lose critical observation, denying them the ability to provide early warning for the BCT.




Figure B-10. Orient on the protected force, area, or facility

Vignette 11. Perform Continuous Reconnaissance

- Phase line (PL) IRON (occupation of screen): As the platoon leader occupies the screen, the platoon is engaged with cannon-delivered indirect fire from an enemy observation post (OP) in the vicinity of PL STEEL (display placard briefly). Indirect fire contact causes the platoon leader to reassess the plan to account for enemy OPs.
 - The platoon leader should continue the mission, but issue a fragmentary guidance to address the threat. Once the platoon is in observation range of named area of interest (NAI) 1020, display the dismounted OP placard.
 - The platoon leader should coordinate indirect fire to disrupt them. If the platoon leader fails to coordinate activity, the enemy repeats its fire mission and displaces to an alternate OP (display placard again and remove).
 - If the platoon leader coordinates indirect fire rapidly, the enemy is destroyed (turn over placard). The platoon should continue its mission immediately.
- NAI 1030: The motorized enemy infantry squad attempts to infiltrate the screen from the south. Enemy elements engage the platoon with direct fire weapons, and then withdraw out of visual range (reveal placard and remove). Assess the platoon with two casualties: one urgent and one priority (turn over friendly placard). This forces the platoon leader to coordinate casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), disrupting continuous reconnaissance.
 - Cavalry leadership dilemma: The platoon leader must evacuate casualties while maintaining security and performing continuous reconnaissance. The platoon leader must move a CASEVAC vehicle to the casualties and determine if preplanned casualty collection points (CCPs) are sufficient. If CCP locations are insufficient or do not have adequate cover and concealment, the CASEVAC vehicle must move to a CCP directed by the exercise controller (EXCON). This will waste time, endangering the casualties, and prevent the CASEVAC vehicle from returning to its mounted OP site. This causes gaps in the screen, obstructing continuous reconnaissance.
 - The platoon leader must assess the situation and determine if he needs to reposition elements and assets to maintain observation of assigned NAIs.

- Avenue of approach (AoA) JUPITER: An enemy armored reconnaissance platoon is identified conducting a zone reconnaissance along AoA JUPITER. The enemy element maneuvers west and attempts to engage the platoon (display placard). The platoon leader is forced to engage the enemy.
 - The platoon leader reports all information to higher headquarters.
 - As the enemy force moves toward NAI 1020, increase its rate of march.
 - Cavalry leadership dilemma: The platoon leader must determine when to engage the enemy. This will exercise his engagement criteria. He should report the situation to higher headquarters (HHQ) and begin coordinating. When he engages the enemy, turn over placard. If he does not engage the enemy, allow the enemy to move uncontested through the area of operations (AO).
 - Determine if the platoon leader is reporting rapidly and accurately and if he is adhering to the engagement criteria.
- AoA JUPITER: An enemy armor company is identified moving west along AoA JUPITER (reveal placard). Upon reaching NAI 1020, the enemy tank company changes direction north and maneuvers out of visual range with the use of obscuration fires. Place a smoke placard and remove the tank placards.
 - The platoon leader must coordinate a reconnaissance handover with adjacent units.
 - The platoon leader must report rapidly and accurately.




Figure B-11. Perform continuous reconnaissance

Vignette 12. Maintain Enemy Contact

- Phase line (PL) TIGERS: Engage the platoon with cannon-delivered indirect fire from the north of PL TIGERS at the enemy line of departure (LD) by using a placard against one of the sections. This action should force the platoon leader to find cover and shift observation focus to enemy observation posts (OPs).
 - The platoon leader should continue the mission or issue a fragmentary order (FRAGORD) to address the new information, if necessary. As scout sections continue to observe, reveal enemy support by fire in the vicinity of target area of interest (TAI) 1031 to the section able to make visual contact by placing a placard in or around named area of interest (NAI) 1031.
 - The platoon leader must assess that this support by fire is not an inferior force and maneuver the platoon to destroy the support by fire with multiple forms of contact. If the platoon leader chooses a sound form of maneuver (i.e., envelopment with sections not in contact) and employs multiple forms of contact, the enemy is destroyed (turn over placard and skip to the third scenario). If there is hesitation to act or no purposeful maneuver, move to the second scenario.
- PL INDIANS: An enemy company crosses PL TIGERS. Enemy support by fire engages the platoon with heavy machine guns and antitank weapon systems and destroys multiple vehicles.
 - Cavalry leadership dilemma: The platoon leader must quickly determine if the enemy threat is greater than the platoon can disrupt. The platoon leader must use multiple forms of contact to disrupt the enemy support by fire or report to the troop for additional assets. The platoon must then regain focus on its purpose and gain contact with the main body.
 - If the platoon leader assesses the exploitation force is a like or superior force, he may report to higher command and request additional assets or use direct fire. If the platoon leader conducts a reconnaissance handover with the infantry scout platoon, he has executed one of his key tasks. If the platoon leader hesitates to react or tries to engage with organic systems, continue to assess vehicle damage and casualties.
 - If the platoon leader assesses the support by fire is an inferior force, the platoon leader should engage with multiple forms of contact and maneuver on the enemy support by fire.

- PL INDIANS: The enemy company crosses PL TIGERS and engages the platoon with accurate direct fire weapons. The exploitation force begins to maneuver on the platoon's position.
 - The platoon leader must assess whether the maneuvering element has forces superior to those of the platoon. If so, the platoon leader reports the situation to higher command and requests additional assets to complete his mission. The platoon leader should call for indirect fire on the enemy.
 - If the maneuvering force is inferior, then the platoon leader should maneuver his forces using sound movement formations and techniques to disrupt enemy forces. If the platoon leader's decisions are sound and timely, then destroy the enemy and move to next scenario. If the platoon leader hesitates to act, the enemy engages a section with mortar-fired indirect fires and destroys one vehicle. Assess the actions the platoon leader takes.
- PL BREWERS: The enemy exploitation force has bypassed AoA RUTH and has committed to a different route to the east of the platoon's position. The enemy exploitation force has not been sufficiently disrupted and is now moving toward the assault position.
 - Cavalry leadership dilemma: The platoon leader now must quickly assess his situation. The platoon leader knows his templated enemy used another route to the brigade combat team (BCT). He must decide to either continue to observe along AoA RUTH or maneuver his forces to complete his task of disrupting the exploitation force. He must report to higher command the change in the enemy situation and then maneuver to maintain enemy contact. If he does not report that the enemy main body has changed course or has contacted the infantry scout platoon for handover, then the platoon leader has lost contact with the enemy and failed his mission.
 - If the platoon leader decides to maneuver to maintain contact with the exploitation force, allow the platoon leader to issue a FRAGORD and conduct any maneuver required in the order.




Figure B-12. Maintain enemy contact

Scout Platoon Formations

LAIN GREEN M257 JBC-P ANUYK 128B MG 7.62 RH FEED MG 7.62 MM W240L MG 7.62 MM W240L NETT WARRIOR 2 X NETT WARRIOR 2 X NVG 3 X ANPSG-20 2 X AN PRC-154 ANPVS-14 ANVRC-32F ANPRC-119F ANVRC-144V6 ANVRC-144V6 SHOTGUN 12 GAGE	LAIN GREEN M257 JBC-P ANUYK 128B MG 7.62 RH FEED MG 7.62 MM W240L MG 7.62 MM W240L NETT WARRIOR 2 X NETT WARRIOR 2 X NVG 3 X ANPSG-20 2 X AN PRC-154 ANPVS-14 ANVRC-32F ANPRC-119F ANVRC-144V6 ANVRC-144V6 SHOTGUN 12 GAGE	LAIN GREEN M257 JBC-P ANUYK 128B MG 7.62 RH FEED MG 7.62 MM W240L MG 7.62 MM W240L NETT WARRIOR 2 X NETT WARRIOR 2 X NVG 3 X ANPSG-20 2 X AN PRC-154 ANPVS-14 ANVRC-32F ANPRC-119F ANVRC-144V6 ANVRC-144V6 SHOTGUN 12 GAGE
1 LT 19400 PLT Leader M9M4 SGT 19020 TMR LDR M9M4 SPC 19020 SCOUT M9M4 PFC 19020 CEV DVR M9M4	SG 11000 0 DLT SGT M9M4 SG 19020 SCOUT LDR M9M4 SPC 19020 CEV GUNNER M9M4 PFC 19020 CEV DMR M9M4	SG 19020 SCOUT LDR M9M4 SPC 19020 CEV GUNNER M9M4 PFC 19020 CEV DMR M9M4
SGT 19200 TMR LDR M9M4 SPC 19200 SCOUT M9M4 PFC 19200 CEV DMR M9M4	SG 19200 TMR LDR M9M4 SPC 19200 SCOUT M9M4 PFC 19200 CEV DMR M9M4	SG 19200 TMR LDR M9M4 SPC 19200 SCOUT M9M4 PFC 19200 CEV DMR M9M4
SG 19020 TMR LDR M9M4 SPC 19020 SCOUT M9M4 PFC 19020 CEV DMR M9M4	SG 19020 TMR LDR M9M4 SPC 19020 SCOUT M9M4 PFC 19020 CEV DMR M9M4	SG 19020 TMR LDR M9M4 SPC 19020 SCOUT M9M4 PFC 19020 CEV DMR M9M4
SG 19020 TMR LDR M9M4 SPC 19020 SCOUT M9M4 PFC 19020 CEV DMR M9M4	SG 19020 TMR LDR M9M4 SPC 19020 SCOUT M9M4 PFC 19020 CEV DMR M9M4	SG 19020 TMR LDR M9M4 SPC 19020 SCOUT M9M4 PFC 19020 CEV DMR M9M4

Figure B-13. Armored brigade combat team (ABCT) scout platoon

MG 7.62 MM M240L MG .50 CAL DVE ANV/AS-5 AN PRC-119 2 X AN PRC-154 ANVRC-104 ANTAS-8 SHOTGUN ANVRC-32F(C) JBC-P ANU/YK-128B(V)3 PFC 19D10 SCOUT MA ANPVS-14 PFC 19D10 SCOUT MA NVG	2/0/22/24 	MG .50 CAL SHOTGUN 12 GAU 2 X MG 7.62 MM 240L ANTAS-8 2 X ANVRC-104 DVE ANV/AS-5 ANVRC-31F(C) 3 X ANPVSQ-20 2 X NVG JBC-P ANU/YK-128B 2 X ANPVS-14 2 X ANVRC-154	MG 50 CAL SHOTGUN 12 GAU 2 X MG 7.62 MM 240L ANTAS-8 2 X ANVRC-104 DVE ANV/AS-5 ANVRC-9-1F(C) 3 X ANPVSQ-20 2 X NVG JBC-P ANU/YK-128B 2 X ANPVS-14 2 X ANVRC-154	MG GREN 40 MM MK19 MOD SHOTGUN 12 GAU 2 X MG 7.62 MM 240L ANTAS-8 2 X ANVRC-104 DVE ANV/AS-5 ANVRC-9-1F(C) 3 X ANPVSQ-20 2 X NVG JBC-P ANU/YK-128B 2 X ANPVS-14 2 X ANVRC-154	MG GREN 40 MM MK19 MOD SHOTGUN 12 GAU 2 X MG 7.62 MM 240L ANTAS-8 2 X ANVRC-104 DVE ANV/AS-5 ANVRC-9-1F(C) 3 X ANPVSQ-20 2 X NVG JBC-P ANU/YK-128B 2 X ANPVS-14 2 X ANVRC-154
MG 7.62MM M240L MG .50 CAL DVE ANV/AS-5 AN PRC-119 2 X AN PRC-154 ANVRC-104 ANTAS-8 SHOTGUN ANVRC-32F(C) JBC-P ANU/YK-128B(V)3 PFC 19D10 SCOUT MA NVG		SFC 19D40 PLT SGT M4 ANPVSQ-20 SPC 19D10 SCOUT/GNR MA ANPVSQ-20 SGT 19D20 TEAM LDR MA NVG SPC 19D10 SCOUT MA NVG PFC 19D10 SCOUT MA NVG	SFC 19D30 SQUAD LDR MA SPC 19D10 SCOUT/GNR MA PFC 19D10 SCOUT/DRV MA SGT 19D20 TM LDR MA SPC 19D10 SCOUT MA PFC 19D10 SCOUT MA	SFC 19D30 SQUAD LDR MA SPC 19D10 SCOUT/GNR MA PFC 19D10 SCOUT/DRV MA SGT 19D20 TM LDR MA SPC 19D10 SCOUT MA PFC 19D10 SCOUT MA	SFC 19D30 SQUAD LDR MA SPC 19D10 SCOUT/GNR MA PFC 19D10 SCOUT/DRV MA SGT 19D20 TM LDR MA SPC 19D10 SCOUT MA PFC 19D10 SCOUT MA
MG 7.62MM M240L MG .50 CAL DVE ANV/AS-5 AN PRC-119 2 X AN PRC-154 ANVRC-104 ANTAS-8 SHOTGUN ANVRC-32F(C) JBC-P ANU/YK-128B(V)3 PFC 19D10 SCOUT MA NVG		SFC 19D40 PLT SGT M4 ANPVSQ-20 SPC 19D10 SCOUT/GNR MA ANPVSQ-20 SGT 19D20 TEAM LDR MA NVG SPC 19D10 SCOUT MA NVG PFC 19D10 SCOUT MA NVG	SFC 19D30 SQUAD LDR MA SPC 19D10 SCOUT/GNR MA PFC 19D10 SCOUT/DRV MA SGT 19D20 TM LDR MA SPC 19D10 SCOUT MA PFC 19D10 SCOUT MA	SFC 19D30 SQUAD LDR MA SPC 19D10 SCOUT/GNR MA PFC 19D10 SCOUT/DRV MA SGT 19D20 TM LDR MA SPC 19D10 SCOUT MA PFC 19D10 SCOUT MA	SFC 19D30 SQUAD LDR MA SPC 19D10 SCOUT/GNR MA PFC 19D10 SCOUT/DRV MA SGT 19D20 TM LDR MA SPC 19D10 SCOUT MA PFC 19D10 SCOUT MA

Figure B-14. Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) scout platoon

3/0/69/172	
MK-19 LRAS3 ANTAS-8 CLUJAVELIN DVE ANVAS-5 ANVRC-92F ANVRC-104 PRC 150-HF ANVRC-119F JBC-P ANUYK-128/HF RADIO SET HH Z01320 2 X NVG	MG 50 CAL LRAS3 ANTAS-3 CLUJAVELIN DVE ANVAS-5 ANVRC-91F JBC-P ANUYK-128/HV3 RADIO SET HH Z01320 2 X NVG
MK-19 LRAS3 ANTAS-8 CLUJAVELIN DVE ANVAS-5 ANVRC-92F ANVRC-104 PRC 150-HF ANVRC-119F JBC-P ANUYK-128/HV3 RADIO SET HH Z01320 2 X NVG	SSG 19D30 SEC LDR M4 SGT 19D20 TEAM LDR M4 SPC 19D10 JAVELIN GNR M4 PFC 19D10 SCOUT M4
MK-19 LRAS3 ANTAS-8 CLUJAVELIN DVE ANVAS-5 ANVRC-92F ANVRC-104 PRC 150-HF ANVRC-119F JBC-P ANUYK-128/HV3 RADIO SET HH Z01320 2 X NVG	MG 50 CAL LRAS3 ANTAS-3 CLUJAVELIN DVE ANVAS-5 ANVRC-91F JBC-P ANUYK-128/HV3 RADIO SET HH Z01320 2 X NVG
MK-19 LRAS3 ANTAS-8 CLUJAVELIN DVE ANVAS-5 ANVRC-92F ANVRC-104 PRC 150-HF ANVRC-119F JBC-P ANUYK-128/HV3 RADIO SET HH Z01320 2 X NVG	SGT 19D30 SEC LDR M4 SGT 19D20 TEAM LDR M4 SPC 19D10 JAVELIN GNR M4 PFC 19D10 SCOUT M4
MK-19 LRAS3 ANTAS-8 CLUJAVELIN DVE ANVAS-5 ANVRC-92F ANVRC-104 PRC 150-HF ANVRC-119F JBC-P ANUYK-128/HV3 RADIO SET HH Z01320 2 X NVG	TOMITAS CLUJAVELIN DVE ANVAS-5 ANVRC-91F JBC-P ANUYK-128/HV3 RADIO SET HH Z01320 2 X NVG
MK-19 LRAS3 ANTAS-8 CLUJAVELIN DVE ANVAS-5 ANVRC-92F ANVRC-104 PRC 150-HF ANVRC-119F JBC-P ANUYK-128/HV3 RADIO SET HH Z01320 2 X NVG	TOMITAS CLUJAVELIN DVE ANVAS-5 ANVRC-91F JBC-P ANUYK-128/HV3 RADIO SET HH Z01320 2 X NVG
MK-19 LRAS3 ANTAS-8 CLUJAVELIN DVE ANVAS-5 ANVRC-92F ANVRC-104 PRC 150-HF ANVRC-119F JBC-P ANUYK-128/HV3 RADIO SET HH Z01320 2 X NVG	SGT 19D20 TEAM LDR M4 SGT 19D20 TOW GNR M4 SPC 19D10 SCOUT M4 PFC SCOUT 19D10 M4
MK-19 LRAS3 ANTAS-8 CLUJAVELIN DVE ANVAS-5 ANVRC-92F ANVRC-104 PRC 150-HF ANVRC-119F JBC-P ANUYK-128/HV3 RADIO SET HH Z01320 2 X NVG	30 X NVG ANPSQ-20 6 X ANPVS-14 4 X PISTOL 9MM 4 X LAUNCHER GREN M320A1 MG 7.62MM M240L 8 X SHOT GUN 79223

Figure B-15. Infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) scout platoon

Placards







Figure B-16. Enemy placards



Obstacle:
- Composition:
- Grids to 4 corners:
- Dimension:
- Orientation:



Obstacle:
- Composition:
- Grids to 4 corners:
- Dimension:
- Orientation:



Obstacle:
- Composition:
- Grids to 4 corners:
- Dimension:
- Orientation:

Figure B-17. Obstacle placards



Figure B-18. Friendly placards




Figure B-19. Friendly placards

Appendix C

References

Army Publications

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*. 10 OCT 2011.

Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1, *The Army Profession*, 14 JUN 2015.

Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-20.96, *Reconnaissance and Cavalry Squadron*, 12 MAY 2016.

ATP 3-20.98, *Reconnaissance Platoon*, 05 APR 2013.

Field Manual (FM) 3-20.971, *Reconnaissance and Cavalry Troop*, August 2009.

FM 3-98, *Reconnaissance and Security Operations*, 01 JUL 2015.

Army Training Network. *A Leader's Guide to After Action Reviews (AARs)*, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS, December 2013.

Brewster II, Frank. "Using Tactical Decision Exercises to Study Tactics." *Military Review*, Volume LXXXII, No. 6, November-December 2002.

MacNab, Ian A. "Kriegsspiel and the Sandtable: Using Tabletop Wargames to Teach Tactics and Exercise Decision Making in the Classroom." Center for Teaching Excellence, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, 2012.

Other Publications

Schmitt, John F. *How We Decide Designing TDGs: A Tactical Decision Games Workbook*. Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA, 1998.

Vandergriff, Donald E. *Raising the Bar: Creating and Nurturing Adaptability to Deal with the Changing Face of War*. World Security Institute's Center for Defense Information, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, D.C. 20036-2109, 2006.

Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center. *Design and Delivery of Tactical Decision Games: TDGS/STEX Workbook*. Wildland Fire Leadership Development Program, TDG Library, TDG References, September 2007. Available online at http://www.fireleadership.gov/toolbox/TDG_Library/references/TDGS_STEX_Workbook.pdf.

Websites

The Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS) online at https://atn.army.mil/dsp_CATSviewer01.aspx.

Army Training Network (ATN) online at <https://atn.army.mil/>.

SUBMIT INFORMATION OR REQUEST PUBLICATIONS

To help you access information efficiently, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) posts publications and other useful products available for download on the CALL website:

<http://call.army.mil>

**PROVIDE LESSONS AND BEST PRACTICES
OR SUBMIT AN AFTER ACTION REVIEW (AAR)**

If your unit has identified lessons or best practices or would like to submit an AAR or a request for information (RFI), please contact CALL using the following information:

Telephone: DSN 552-9569/9533; Commercial 913-684-9569/9533

Fax: DSN 552-4387; Commercial 913-684-4387

Mailing Address: Center for Army Lessons Learned
ATTN: Chief, Collection and Analysis Division
10 Meade Ave., Bldg. 50
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350

REQUEST COPIES OF CALL PUBLICATIONS

If you would like copies of this publication, please submit your request on the CALL restricted website (CAC login required):

<https://call2.army.mil>

Click on “Request for Publications.” Please fill in all the information, including your unit name and street address. Please include building number and street for military posts.

NOTE: Some CALL publications are no longer available in print. Digital publications are available by clicking on “Publications by Type” under the “Resources” tab on the CALL restricted website, where you can access and download information. CALL also offers Web-based access to the CALL archives.

CALL produces the following publications on a variety of subjects:

- **Handbooks**
- **Bulletins, Newsletters, and Observation Reports**
- **Special Studies**
- ***News From the Front***
- **Training Lessons and Best Practices**
- **Initial Impressions Reports**

FOLLOW CALL ON SOCIAL MEDIA



https://twitter.com/USArmy_CALL

<https://www.facebook.com/CenterforArmyLessonsLearned>

COMBINED ARMS CENTER (CAC)
Additional Publications and Resources

The CAC home page address is: <http://usacac.army.mil>

Center for Army Leadership (CAL)

CAL plans and programs leadership instruction, doctrine, and research. CAL integrates and synchronizes the Professional Military Education Systems and Civilian Education System. Find CAL products at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cal>.

Combat Studies Institute (CSI)

CSI is a military history think tank that produces timely and relevant military history and contemporary operational history. Find CSI products at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/csipubs.asp>.

Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD)

CADD develops, writes, and updates Army doctrine at the corps and division level. Find the doctrinal publications at either the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) at <http://www.apd.army.mil> or the Central Army Registry (formerly known as the Reimer Digital Library) at <http://www.adtdl.army.mil>.

Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO)

FMSO is a research and analysis center on Fort Leavenworth under the TRADOC G-2. FMSO manages and conducts analytical programs focused on emerging and asymmetric threats, regional military and security developments, and other issues that define evolving operational environments around the world. Find FMSO products at <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil>.

Military Review (MR)

MR is a revered journal that provides a forum for original thought and debate on the art and science of land warfare and other issues of current interest to the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense. Find MR at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/militaryreview>.

TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)

TRISA is a field agency of the TRADOC G-2 and a tenant organization on Fort Leavenworth. TRISA is responsible for the development of intelligence products to support the policy-making, training, combat development, models, and simulations arenas.

Capability Development Integration Directorate (CDID)

CDID conducts analysis, experimentation, and integration to identify future requirements and manage current capabilities that enable the Army, as part of the Joint Force, to exercise Mission Command and to operationalize the Human Dimension. Find CDID at <http://usacac.army.mil/organizations/mccoe/cdid>.

Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA)

JCISFA's mission is to capture and analyze security force assistance (SFA) lessons from contemporary operations to advise combatant commands and military departments on appropriate doctrine; practices; and proven tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to prepare for and conduct SFA missions efficiently. JCISFA was created to institutionalize SFA across DOD and serve as the DOD SFA Center of Excellence. Find JCISFA at <https://jcisfa.jcs.mil/Public/Index.aspx>.

Support CAC in the exchange of information by telling us about your successes so they may be shared and become Army successes.

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED
10 Meade Avenue, Building 50
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350



**COBRA TEAM, OPERATIONS GROUP
NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER
FORT IRWIN, CA**



www.leavenworth.army.mil



"Intellectual Center of the Army"

**APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED**